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The past decades have witnessed wireless communications trac exploding. The static
spectrum allocation approach can hardly meet the soaring service requirement. Therefore,
dierent spectrum sharing methodologies emerged, such as Authorized Spectrum Access, TV
White Space, unlicensed usage, etc. The vast amounts of research work demonstrates that
spectrum sharing provides exibility in spectrum access, increases spectrum usage eciency,
and improves spectrum users utilities.
Despite of these advantages, spectrum sharing has been adopted slowly due in part to
the embedded risks. Specically, each spectrum sharing method leads to dierent costs,
revenue, and Quality of Services (QoS) levels. Based on spectrum users requirement on
QoS and prots, they encounter distinct risks. Meanwhile, risks may not necessarily lead to
failure. Spectrum users can actively cope with risks through mitigation strategies. Moreover,
like any engineering investment, spectrum usage is a decision making process for spectrum
users. Dierent choices are made based on distinct incentives and limitations.
In order to transform spectrum sharing from a radical strategy to commercial reality, it is
essential to quantify risks that associate with each spectrum usage method and understand
spectrum users decision process. Consequently, this dissertation focuses on determining ex-
pected prots, QoS level, risks, and mitigation strategies for each spectrum sharing method,
and applying a decision model to analyze spectrum users' choices.
In detail, two types of risks are modeled in this dissertation: (1) QoS risks with respect to
throughput, and (2) monetary risks in terms of prots. Specically, QoS risks are quantied
by M/G/C queue. Monetary risks consider costs, revenues, and mitigation strategies. The
iv
value of mitigation strategies is determined by the real options approach to reect the worth
of management exibility. The best spectrum usage method is identied according to decision
criteria such as prots maximization and risk minimization.
The merit of this dissertation is two-fold. First, it helps spectrum entrants select the
most appropriate spectrum sharing method based on existing spectrum usage environment,
potentials of each method, as well as their goals and limitations. Second, it helps regulators,
policy makers, and spectrum market understand spectrum entrants' behavior and create
interventions in order to obtain favorable outcomes.
v
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Spectrum, which supports the transmission of sound, data, and video, is one of the most
valuable wireless communication networks resources. Two authorities are responsible for
managing spectrum in the U.S.: the National Telecommunications and Information Ad-
ministration (NTIA) and the Federal Communication Commission (FCC). NTIA manages
spectrum used by federal government while FCC is responsible for spectrum used by indi-
viduals, private organizations, public safety, and health ocials [1].
In the non-federal spectrum domain, the FCC has two primary spectrum management
approaches: command-and-control for licensed bands and commons or open access for un-
licensed bands. In the command-and-control approach, a xed amount of spectrum is as-
signed to wireless service providers for a certain technology, application and specic period
of time. According to [2], the command-and-control approach involves four steps: allocation,
adoption of service rules, assignment, and enforcement. In the allocation process, the FCC
determines the type of use for each spectrum bands. Then, it establishes rules that specify
the transmission parameters and rules for the service allocated in this band. Four types of
assignment mechanisms have been adopted throughout the year: st-come-rst served licens-
ing, lotteries, comparative hearings, and auctions. Finally, the FCC enforces its allocations,
rules, assignments against spectrum users. In the commons approach, unlimited number of
unlicensed users are allowed to access the spectrum that are governed by technical standards
or etiquette on a non-protection basis [3].
1
1.1 WHY SPECTRUM SHARING
The dominant challenge for licensed bands is that the rapid proliferation of various forms of
mobile devices, coupled with the expansion of wireless Internet services, made it impossible
to allocate enough spectrum to new entrants and incumbents [4]. Two problems lead to
this spectrum scarcity situation, namely the spectrum access problem and the full usage
problem. The spectrum access problem means the spectrum is still available, but it cannot
be accessed. The full usage problem, on the other hand, means the spectrum has already been
fully occupied, but it does not yield reasonable eciency because of the lag in technology.
The rst problem can be solved by allowing more users to access that spectrum band; while
the second one can be improved by adopting advanced technologies or devices [5].
In fact, observations showed that spectrum scarcity is mostly a spectrum access problem
[4, 5, 6]. According to the FCC, license holders did not fully use their spectrum. The
consumption of spectrum only accounts for 15% to 85% in spatial and temporal variations
[7]. Specically, the average spectrum utilization in Chicago for the frequency bands below
3 GHz was 17.4% during two days measurement [8]. The average spectrum occupancy was
13% in New York City between August 31 and September 1, 2004 [8].
The spectrum access problem stems from the concept of exclusive usage inherent in the
command-and-control approach and spectrum auction assignment mechanism. Under this
strategy, spectrum users other than licensees are not allowed to access the spectrum. This
exclusive usage largely prevents man-made interference from nearby geographic areas and
frequencies, and then avoids costly enforcement actions [3]. It also guarantees a level of
predictable usage and therefore service reliability. Notably, predictable usage is achieved at
the expense of spectrum utilization eciency, which is not a problem when the spectrum
demand is relatively easily met through technology innovation that expanded the range
of economically feasible frequencies [9]. However, as the spectrum access requests grow
exponentially, exclusive usage that is achieved by a static spectrum allocation strategy can
hardly meet the soaring demand.
Unlicensed usage, on the other hand, eliminates the barrier of spectrum access. In the
unlicensed bands, all spectrum users have equal rights to utilize frequencies. The Industrial,
2
Scientic and Medical (ISM) band is well known for unlicensed usage. It has been extraor-
dinarily successful in stimulating innovation and short-range communications. The main
advantage of unlicensed usage is exibility and the absence of licensing costs. The challenge
of unlicensed usage derives from this merit as well. Without incentives to reserve spectrum
and coordination, catastrophic interference among spectrum users may occur.
To address the apparent spectrum scarcity and service reliability, spectrum sharing in
licensed bands, as a compromised approach, has moved from being a radical notion to a
principal policy focus in the past decade. In contrast to exclusive usage, spectrum sharing
provides the exibility needed to respond to temporal and spatial variations of trac statis-
tics and bandwidth requirements of dierent services. It is an ex post strategy to assign
spectrum on demand and improve usage eciency of the initial spectrum allocation. Also,
unlike unlicensed usage, where reliable services are dicult to maintain, users in spectrum
sharing have the opportunity to negotiate spectrum sharing etiquette and achieve expected
QoS.
Spectrum sharing in licensed frequency bands is organized under a hierarchical spectrum
rights regime. Accordingly, two categories of users are formed: Primary Users (PUs) and
Secondary Users (SUs). PUs are license owners of the frequency bands, and SUs are parties
that obtain subordinate rights to access the spectrum. SUs are wireless service providers
that do not have the FCC authorized licenses but provide service on certain frequency bands.
In this dissertation, the term spectrum entrant is used to describe users that seek frequency
bands to provide wireless services. Depends on their spectrum usage choices, they will
become a PU or SU when they enter the wireless market. The term spectrum users includes
both PUs and SUs.
While conceptually simple, the realization of spectrum sharing gives rise to several tech-
nical, regulatory, and economic challenges. Technical challenges emanate from the inherent
diculty of accurately sensing radio environments and eciently coordinating transmission
activities. The regulatory issues deal with the need to motivate spectrum sharing by liberal-
izing spectrum license and adjusting policies. Economic problems concern about secondary
spectrum market and trading frameworks. The following section provides an overview of
technical and regulatory evolution that make spectrum sharing possible.
3
1.2 EVOLUTION THAT MAKES SPECTRUM SHARING POSSIBLE
Spectrum sharing only happens when both technology and policies are ready. In reality, tech-
nology innovations and policy adjustment intertwine with each other. This section outlines
the evolution of technology and policies that make spectrum sharing come true.
1.2.1 EVOLUTION OF REGULATIONS
Since the spectrum has become a scarce resource, regulators have been seeking policies
that oer more spectrum access opportunities. This section briey summarizes the major
regulation milestones in this regard.
First, in the year 2000, the FCC issued several policy statements [10] indicating its
guidelines for promoting ecient use of the radio spectrum through the development of
secondary markets. In 2003, the FCC issued regulation on spectrum leasing that specied
some of the methods to enter into leasing arrangements for wireless radio licensees [10].
Spectrum leasing and secondary spectrum market partially change the command-and-control
strategy to a right based regulation, which permits organizations to transfer, purchase, and
sell the rights to use spectrum in private market transactions [11].
Second, the FCC created the Spectrum Policy Task Force (SPTF) in June 2002 to study
alternatives to command-and-control approach. They were charged with making specic
recommendations on a more integrated, market-oriented approach that would lead to greater
regulatory certainty while minimizing regulatory intervention. In particular, they assisted
the FCC in addressing spectrum issues such as interference protection, spectral eciency,
eective public safety communications, and implications of international spectrum policies
[12].
One of the suggestions that SPTF made is the Interference Temperature metric. The
goal of Interference Temperature is to provide more spectrum access opportunities for SUs
and maintain the existing QoS for PUs. Specically, an Interference Temperature threshold
was to be determined for each frequency band, and SUs would be permitted to transmit in
any band as long as they did not cause the threshold to be exceeded [12]. The majority of
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comments suggested the FCC to terminate the broad proceeding, especially in the 6 GHz
bands that support critical infrastructure industries [13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. Incumbents are
understandably uncomfortable about Interference Temperature due to the extra uncertainty
and potential competition [18]. Parties that would be directly benet from the Interference
Temperature metric, such as unlicensed device industry, the Wi-Fi Alliance and the IEEE 802
group, also doubted the performance of implementing the Interference Temperature concept
due to the technical diculties and economic uncertainties. In May 2007, the FCC published
the ORDER to terminate the Interference Temperature proceeding without prejudice to its
substantive merits [19].
Third, in 2008, the FCC released the Second Report and Order [20] to allow unli-
censed devices to transmit in the broadcast television frequency bands at locations where
licensed services are absent, referred to as TV white space (TVWS). All devices except
personal/portable devices operating in client mode must have three capabilities in order
to operate in the TVWS: (1) geolocation capability; (2) capability to access the database
and obtain a list of the permitted channels before transmission; (3) capability to sense TV
broadcasting and wireless microphone signals. In 2010, the Second Memorandum Opinion
and Order [21] eliminates the sensing requirement for TV bands devices with geo-location
capability and ability to access the database. In 2012, the FCC further dened channel
emission limit and maximum permissible power spectral density in the Third Memorandum
Opinion and Order [22].
Fourth, the 2010 Presidential Memorandum \Unleashing the Wireless Broadband Rev-
olution" requires 500 MHz of spectrum to be made available for commercial use within 10
years [23]. In 2012, President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST)
further advised the president to require the Secretary of Commerce to identify 1000 MHz
of federal spectrum in which to implement shared-use spectrum pilot projects [24]. In De-
cember 2012, the FCC proposed a three-tiered prioritization spectrum scheme, which allows
two new categories of commercial use into the federal frequency bands [25]. NTIA issued
reports to evaluate dierent federal and non-federal spectrum bands for accommodating
wireless broadband systems. Those bands include Meteorological-Satellite (space-to-earth)
and Meteorological aids services on 1675-1710 MHz, federal government for xed and mobile
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services in 1755-1780 MHz, Department of Defense Radar service in 3500-3650 MHz, and
internationally reserved for radio altimeters in 4200-4220 MHz, 4380-4400 MHz bands [26].
Last but not least, a new licensed model, called Authorized Shared Access (ASA), au-
thorizes spectrum entrants (ASA licensees) to have the exclusive rights where and when
spectrum is not used by PUs. It aims at authorizing spectrum sharing in licensed frequency
band in real-time. Moreover, the ASA platform is fully congurable so PUs can alter the
sharing etiquette and constraints. Three items compose the ASA model: spectrum alloca-
tion engine, spectrum supply manager, and coexistence manager. Spectrum allocation engine
optimizes spectrum allocations considering constraints such as geographic area, bandwidth,
time, QoS, and regulation. Spectrum supply manager is the communication interface to ex-
ternal band managers. Coexistence manager ensures co-located users can achieve expected
levels of QoS through coordination [27].
1.2.2 EVOLUTION OF TECHNOLOGY
Besides the evolution of spectrum regulation policies, the industry also witnessed technology
innovations. Several technologies that emerged during the past decades facilitate spectrum
sharing. In this section, a brief overview of ultra-wide band, software dened radio, cognitive
radio, spectrum sensing, and channel aggregation will be provided.
Ultra-wide band (UWB) is a radio technology that transmits a signal over a very large
portion of radio spectrum at low power [28]. According to the FCC, the bandwidth for UWB
should exceed the lesser of 500 MHz or 20% of the arithmetic center frequency. In February
2004, the FCC authorized the unlicensed use of UWB in frequency bands range from 3.1
GHz to 10.6 GHz. The required power spectrum density limit is -41.3 dBm/MHz [29].
Software Dened Radio (SDR) is another advanced technology. It is a radio communica-
tion system where components such as mixers, lters, ampliers, modulators/demodulators,
and detectors are implemented by means of software on a computer or embedded system
[30]. The dominant advantage of software dened radio is that the radio system can be con-
gured on-the-y. That is, the transmission parameters can be recongured depending on
services requirements and existing spectrum usage situation. Three well-known software ra-
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dio systems are listed here as examples. They are: GNU Radio project at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT) [31], Iris that developed in the University of Dublin and
Trinity College [32], and Sora that was developed by the Microsoft Research group [33].
Cognitive radio was proposed by Mitola in 1999 [34]. As dened by the FCC \A cognitive
radio (CR) is a radio that can change its transmitter parameters based on interaction with
the environment in which it operates. The majority of cognitive radios use SDR, but neither
having software nor being eld programmable are requirements of a cognitive radio." In
particular, CR makes an autonomous decision on how to congure itself to maximize the
satisfaction of the communication requirements with four inputs, namely (1) the environment
in which it operates; (2) the communication requirements of the users; (3) the regulatory
policies which apply to it; and (4) its own capabilities [28].
The last key technology that enhances the spectrum sharing is spectrum aggregation,
also called carrier aggregation. Spectrum aggregation is proposed in Long-Term Evolution
(LTE) Advance, which allows multiple contiguous and non-contiguous spectrum bands to be
treated as one virtual wideband pipe. Carrier aggregation can go beyond LTE frequencies to
further enlarge the potential benets [35]. The major advantage of spectrum aggregation is
that spectrum users can provide a high data rate over multiple small fragments of spectrum
that they bought from dierent PUs or left by PUs' inactive services. It improves wireless
services' performance and increase the value of fragmented spectrum blocks [36].
1.3 MOTIVATION
While spectrum sharing provides exibility, certain level of QoS guarantees, and an increase
spectrum utilization eciency, it has been adopted slowly. Several factors impede spectrum
entrants from sharing spectrum: (1) the quantity of shareable spectrum; (2) cost of ac-
cessing spectrum, including both monetary cost and processing time; (3) uncertainties and
risks in spectrum sharing. The FCC and NTIA have made a great eort to enlarge the
amount of shareable spectrum. For example, the TVWS is free for unlicensed access, and
federal frequency bands, such as 1670 MHz and 3.5 GMz, are under consideration for federal-
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commercial sharing. Moreover, with the database assisted approach, the processing time of
authorization is signicantly shortened. Additionally, spectrum is allowed to be traded in
the secondary spectrum market. When requirements are met, the trading can be approved
within 24 hours.
Although more spectrum has been made available for sharing and the cost has been
reduced, uncertainties and risks that are embedded in each spectrum sharing method still
exist. Moreover, these uncertainties and risks are the very barrier that hinders spectrum
sharing from proliferating, in part because spectrum entrants and incumbents will not share
spectrum when future conditions are dicult to foreseen.
Therefore, minimizing risks is essential to fulll the great potentials of spectrum sharing.
Several solutions reduce the spectrum sharing risks. Enforcement that make spectrum shar-
ing etiquette more eective can reduce risks for both PUs and SUs. From PUs' perspectives,
understanding the risks that may bring from spectrum sharing and techniques that allow
them to modify SUs' transmissions reduce risks. [37] investigates the impact from secondary
spectrum market to a GSM based cellular license holder, and analyzes PUs' incentives in
sharing the spectrum. Risks and incentives for spectrum entrants are equally important,
since they are the demand side of spectrum sharing. In addition, spectrum sharing risks
vary with spectrum sharing methods, such as cooperative sharing through trading, ASA,
TVWS, Cognitive Radio (CR) based DSA, and unlicensed usage in the ISM bands. They
also change with locations, coverage, and frequency bands.
Consequently, this dissertation aims at minimizing risks for spectrum entrants and inves-
tigate their incentives in selecting a particular spectrum sharing method. In brief, quantifying
the spectrum risks for each spectrum usage method is the rst step. It will assist spectrum
entrants in making informed decision based on their decision criteria, incentives, and lim-
itations. Moreover, risks do not necessarily lead to monetary loss or services degradation,
because spectrum entrants have mitigation strategies to cope with risks. They have the ca-
pability to adjust their decisions in unexpected situations. Therefore, identifying mitigation
strategies that embedded in each spectrum usage method and quantifying the value of these
mitigation strategies also reduce spectrum entrants' 1 risks. In general, the focus of this
1A spectrum entrant is a potential wireless service provider who has not enter the wireless market.
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research is driven by two questions:
 Why should a spectrum entrant choose a specic spectrum usage model? Under what
conditions?
 What are risks and mitigation strategies in each spectrum usage model?
The outcome of this dissertation will assist spectrum entrants in selecting the most ap-
propriate spectrum usage method given their situations. It will also help understanding
the potential problems for each spectrum sharing method. Therefore, policy makers, oper-
ators, and the spectrum market could create interventions in order to obtain the favorable
outcomes.
1.4 DISSERTATION OUTLINE
This dissertation is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides a literature review of the
spectrum sharing domain. Chapter 3 proposes research questions and methodologies include
decision models, real options, and queueing system. Chapter 4 describes spectrum usage
methods that will be analyzed in this dissertation. Chapter 5 qualitatively identify risks
and mitigation strategies in each spectrum usage method. Chapter 6 illustrates the decision
and risks analysis model for spectrum usage. Chapter 7 provides numerical results and
discussion. Chapter 8 concludes the dissertation and proposes future research directions.
Typically, they fact the problem of selecting one spectrum usage method before becoming a wireless service
provider.
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2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW
As mentioned above, an explicitly understanding of spectrum entrants' spectrum usage
choices based on incentives, risks, and mitigation approaches is essential for both spectrum
users and regulators. However, research eorts are light on this issue. The incentives and
risks that PUs have for sharing spectrum have been studied in [37, 38, 39, 40]. [37] quanti-
es the impact of secondary spectrum market on a GSM-based cellular license-holder. [38]
points out the importance of risk management in spectrum sharing, and analyzes risks in
terms of interference. [39] provides a high level risk analysis in spectrum usage from business
and management perspective. [40] indicates that without a clear understanding of potential
risks, spectrum sharing in 3.5 GHz is too good to be true.
Although research in decision and risk analysis of spectrum usage can be hardly found,
research eorts in related areas are crucial for this dissertation. Therefore, this chapter
provides literature review in pertinent elds: technologies in spectrum sharing, spectrum
rights and spectrum trading.
2.1 TECHNOLOGIES IN SPECTRUM SHARING
From a technology perspective, there are two major activities of spectrum sharing. The rst
one is identifying spectrum holes by sensing or modeling. The second one is sharing the
available spectrum eciently.
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2.1.1 SPECTRUM SENSING
Spectrum sensing is the key component for sensing based opportunistic sharing. It provides
SUs with the current spectrum utilization situation and identies spectrum holes. Sensing
accuracy and security are the two challenges for spectrum sensing.
Sensing techniques start from energy sensing, in which sensors compare the observed
energy value with a predetermined threshold and decide the spectrum availability. The
major problem for energy sensing is that it cannot dierentiate signals from interference.
In order to overcome this shortcoming, advanced sensing technologies emerged, such as
matched lter detection, cyclostationary feature detection, and eigenvalue-based detection.
While these alternatives provide higher accuracy, they require a priori knowledge of the signal
shape and intensify the computational complexity. Furthermore, no matter how advanced
the technology is, individual sensing faces hidden node, fading, and multipath problems.
Collaborative sensing, which requires cooperation among sensors, is known to be a more
reliable approach. [41] compares the cooperative detection with individual spectrum sens-
ing in TVWS. [42] shows that the detection performance can be signicantly improved by
collaborative sensing in fading channels. [43] suggests that SUs can be divided into dierent
clusters, then the nal decision is based on the output from the most favorable user in each
cluster. [44] further complicates the model to reect the real situation by assuming dierent
average Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) for SUs instead of constant one.
While collaborative sensing shows its superiority in improving accuracy, it raises security
challenges to the system. There are two ways for malicious users to attack collaborative
sensing. On one hand, by always reporting that PUs are present, malicious users can decrease
SUs' utilization, or they can selshly transmit in these time slots. On the other hand,
malicious users can harm PUs system by always reporting that PUs are absent. Reputation-
based schemes are a common methodology to handle falsication attacks [45]. [46] proposes a
trust value calculation algorithm based on historical local sensing results for each node. [47]
suggests a Weighted Sequential Probability Ratio Test for collaborative sensing and proves
this scheme is robust against Byzantine failure problem. [45] further decouples sensors'
trustworthy from capability in order to lter out real malicious users and protect the benign
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nodes who suer from multipath and fading problems.
2.1.2 MODELING SPECTRUM USAGE
Although spectrum sensing provides spectrum utilization information for SUs, it leads to
extra expense. For example, SUs need to install sensing capabilities which requires expen-
ditures on devices. Moreover, when SUs sense the spectrum, they cannot transmit data,
which decreases the spectrum utilization. Therefore, the spectrum usage model emerged as
an alternative approach to identify spectrum holes.
The majority of spectrum usage model utilizes Markov processes. Gosh, et. al., validate
the Markov process for spectrum utilization by real-time measurements collected in 928-948
MHz [48]. Zahmati, et. al., analyze spectrum holes with one PU and n SUs [49]. They study
the probability of spectrum occupancy for the PU and each SU. Patil, et. al., investigate a
system with two PUs and 2n SUs [50]. They evaluate four performance metrics: blocking
rate, mean number of SUs, utilization ratio, and deprivation rate which is the rate that a SU
is forced to vacate the channel due to PUs' arrival. Both [48] and [51] use a Hidden Markov
process to predict PUs' presence. Similarly, in [52] and [53], the authors adopt a Hidden
Markov process based spectrum sensing mechanisms to detect spectrum hole availability.
The signicant body of research work in modeling spectrum usage helps spectrum en-
trants understand the spectrum usage situations. However, two questionable assumptions
limit their applicability in a real setting. First, the assumption of steady-state behavior is
far from reality for most frequency bands. For example, as shown in [54, 55, 56], voice and
data trac in cellular network has distinct temporal and spatial variations. Particularly, the
trac has a pronounced diurnal behavior which changes with day of the week. Moreover,
the busy and idle periods occurred at dierent time in dierent cells. Second, the majority
of the research work only considers PUs' behavior when modeling spectrum holes. It is true
that PUs have the highest priority in licensed bands and may dominate the spectrum usage.
Nonetheless, competitions among SUs in spectrum access are not negligible. For example,
mobile o-loading comes from mobile operators may occupy unlicensed usage due to the large
quantity of data. Therefore, spectrum usage should be modeled as time-varying behavior
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and considering both PUs' and SUs' trac.
2.1.3 EFFICIENT SHARING
After identifying spectrum holes, SUs start transmitting signals. In order to achieve high
QoS and spectrum utilization eciency, ecient sharing is preferred when there is more than
one SU. Two approaches exist for ecient sharing. The rst one is admission control and
is fullled by MAC schemes. The second one is resource allocations in terms of power level
and channel.
A signicant number of the research papers focus on MAC strategies among SUs in
unlicensed and opportunistic sharing, only a few of which are summarized here. [57] proposes
a common spectrum coordination channel (CSCC), by which SUs coordinate with each
other for spectrum access. [58] further divides SUs into groups and group members share
the same common control channel for signaling. [59] provides a MAC scheme for SUs on
TDMA/FDMA based GSM network. They use a similar concept as a three-way handshake.
SUs exchange a request to send, a clear to send, and a reservation message before operation.
[60] continues the three-way handshake with a concern about the SUs' hardware capability
constraints. Two types of constrains are considered: sensing limitation and transmission
limitation. The Berkeley group suggests that geolocation database is another candidate
for SUs to coordinate with spectrum access. In [61], they argue that instead of providing
information on idle channel, the database should also hold the information about aggregated
emissions to level. In [62], they further claim that SUs can use database to achieve both
frequency- and spatially awareness.
Two types of resources allocation exist in unlicensed bands and opportunistic usage,
power allocation and channel allocation. Under a power allocation regime, [63] uses in-
centives to achieve fairness and eciency by deriving the Nash equilibrium in a repeated
game. [64] investigates power allocation in two distributed schemes with a goal of maxi-
mizing system performance while limiting the interference to primary receivers. [65] models
the multi-channel power allocation as a non-cooperative game with concerns of co-channel
interference among SUs and interference temperature that determined by regulator. Chan-
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nel allocation is often modeled as a graph coloring problem. [66] uses list-coloring scheme
to allocate channel according to three algorithms: distributed greedy algorithm, distributed
fair algorithm, and randomized distributed algorithm. [67] provides a general approxima-
tion method through vertex labeling for channel allocation. It examines the utilization and
fairness in both centralized strategy and distributed approach. The above resource allo-
cation only concerns one spectrum dimension, in [68] authors introduces the concept of a
time-spectrum block and allocate resources in this two dimensional space.
2.2 SPECTRUM RIGHTS
Technologies makes spectrum sharing possible. Policy adaptations such as spectrum rights
help realize spectrum sharing. Therefore, the development of spectrum rights plays an
important role in the evolution of spectrum sharing. In the traditional form, two types
of spectrum rights regimes were identied: the property right and commons. In spectrum
commons, no user has exclusive rights in utilizing spectrum. Instead, any authorized device
can operate in these so called unlicensed bands, such as ISM bands in 2.4GHz. The low
entrance barrier stimulates the innovation in technology and services. Due to the success of
spectrum commons model, the FCC opened the TVWS for unlicensed usage. The spectrum
common regime is quite simple and straightforward, thus the focus of this section is on
property rights.
Traditionally, spectrum users have exclusive usage rights in licensed bands. This means
PUs operate on the spectrum under license terms exclusively. These terms determine location
of transmitters, peak power levels, technologies, service types, operation duration, frequency
bands, etc. PUs cannot change the technology and service type even if they provide higher
prots. For example, TV broadcasters cannot use their spare spectrum for wireless broad-
band. Since PUs do not own the spectrum, they have no rights to trade and exchange license
with other spectrum users. Thus, although the spectrum sharing technology is available, it
is not allowed from policy side.
The ban on bargaining between spectrum licensees was regarded as a barrier by Ronald
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Coase. He pointed out that the most ecient way to assign spectrum is to give it to those
users who value it the most through property-like rights in secondary markets [69]. As
dened in [70]\The term [property rights] implies the ability to buy; hold; use; sell; dispose
of, in whole or in part; or otherwise determine the status of an identiable, separable and
discrete object, right or privilege." Dening spectrum rights as property rights is a leap in
regulation, since the property rights provide license holders the rights to trade and exchange
the license in any dimension of the spectrum in a private market.
However, property right is not designed for spectrum sharing and coexistence due to the
inherent concept of exclusive usage rights. PUs only sell spectrum that they do not operate
on under property right regime. It is a \all-or-nothing" type of sharing. The challenge here
is that it is dicult for PUs to estimate the quantity of idle bands a priori. Therefore, in
order to avoid interference, they tend to behave conservatively by using guard bands and
transmission power caps to prevent potential coexistence. The spectrum cannot be fully
utilized while the exclusive usage right is enforced, since spectrum should not be constraint
by number of users, but the amount of interference that wireless systems can sustain.
The newest spectrum right, spectrum usage right (SUR) [71], dened by Oce of com-
munications (Ofcom), targets spectrum sharing. SUR regulates the emissions that PUs may
radiate in neighboring locations and frequency bands. It provides two major advantages for
spectrum sharing. First, PUs would have greater exibility in selecting technologies and ap-
plications. Second, neighboring spectrum users have a clearer view of potential interference.
2.3 SECONDARY SPECTRUM MARKETS AND TRADING
FRAMEWORKS
After the liberalization of spectrum licenses, PUs have the rights to trade their spectrum
license in the secondary spectrum market. The target of spectrum trading is to allocate
spectrum to users who value it the most. The structure of the market and trading frameworks
signicantly impact the spectrum allocation results.
A signicant body of research has been focussed on spectrum trading, by taking game
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theory and auction based approaches. Game theoretic approaches aim at nding the best
strategies that optimize the utilities in dierent scenarios. [72] investigates the best strategy
for PUs to maximize their prots under QoS constraints in an oligopoly market. [73] improves
the previous work by considering collusion among spectrum users. [74] uses a multi-stage
game to provide a collusion-resistant dynamic pricing approach, in which spectrum users'
utilities are maximized while combating their collusive behaviors. [75] studies the multi-seller
and multi-buyer trading market. Authors use evolution game to investigate the dynamic
behaviors of SUs, and apply non-cooperative game to model PUs' competition. In [76],
authors argue that spectrum is interference-limited not quantity-limited, which means more
than one user can occupy the same channel as long as QoS is acceptable. Therefore, they
develop a multi-winner game with a collusion-resistant mechanism. [77] investigates the
competition among PUs in the situation where two PUs exist and only one SU is in the
market.
The auction based approach treats the spectrum resource as divisible goods and applies
dierent auction mechanisms to maximize revenue or achieve fairness. [78] designs a general
framework to maximize seller's prots with interference constraints in a monopoly market.
[79] provides a winner determining sealed-bid knapsack auction mechanism to allocate spec-
trum to wireless service providers. It further analyzes the interactions between end users
and wireless service providers. In addition to maximize PUs' revenue, [80] aims at enforc-
ing truthfulness and reducing computational complexity. [81] analyzes the competition and
fairness among SUs and discusses the uncertainty about the wireless environments.
In spectrum trading, pricing is the key issue of interest to PUs and SUs. [82] studies
the price war from two perspectives. In the short-term price war, providers lower the price
to gain prots; while in the long-term price war, providers aim at monopolizing the market
by predatory pricing strategy. It also provides responding strategy for small providers and
regulators to avoid illicit competition. [83] explores the price dynamics in multi-seller and
multi-user environment. Instead of assuming that all channels are similar for SUs, they
assume dierent buyers set dierent spectrum values for each channel depending on their
application, operating technologies and locations. They also consider two types of users, the
quality-sensitive and price-sensitive, to make the research more realistic. [84] studies PUs'
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behaviors in three pricing models: market equilibrium pricing, competitive and cooperative
pricing. The objectives and the relationship among PUs are altered in each model. Therefore
PUs adopt dierent strategies to maximize their own prots. [85] proposes two charging
mechanisms in charging SUs in spectrum auction. The rst one is based on received Signal-
to-Interference plus Noise Ratio (SINR) and the second one is based on transmission power.
Other research work in the spectrum trading area mainly focuses on three research ques-
tions. The rst question is how to make the market work. [86] analyzes potential benets and
costs of spectrum trading, as well as regulatory and policy issues relating to it. [87] suggests
that in order to make market to work, rules should endow operators with the highest exi-
bility. [88] further makes four regulatory and statutory recommendations, including \(1) the
elimination of use restrictions for new wireless allocations; (2) the replacement of existing use
restrictions with power limits sucient to minimize the potential for harmful interference;
(3) the enactment of rules expressly allowing private parties to contract around established
interference limits; and (4) the identication of `safe harbor' spectrum leasing arrangements
that are deemed permissible under the FCC's license transfer of control requirements." The
second research question is how to improve market liquidity. [38] suggests that market liq-
uidity can be improved by boosting spectrum availability, increasing achievable QoS and
reducing transaction costs and risks. [89] further proposes a time-limited lease to reduce the
risk and increase spectrum supply. [90] focuses on determining the conditions of viability of
spectrum markets. By using agent-based model, it considers scenarios with dierent market
structure, number of trading participants and amount of trading spectrum. Finally, a set of
research papers examine the question of what are potential causes for market failure. [91, 87]
identies causes for potential market failure including interference, standards, transaction
costs, asymmetric and imperfect information, and market power. In addition, [38] analyzes
the interlinked technical and economic issues associated with spectrum market.
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3.0 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGIES
Before entering the wireless market, spectrum entrants have many spectrum usage methods
to choose from, such as cooperative sharing through trading, CR based DSA, unlicensed
usage, etc. Moreover, each method leads to unique risk portfolio and mitigation strategies.
Therefore, understanding the potentials of each method is very important for spectrum
entrants to make informed decisions and regulators to make interventions for the desired
outcome. Consequently, the objective of this dissertation is to investigate spectrum entrants'
decisions under dierent spectrum usage situations, goals and limitations. 3.1 provides a
comprehensive list of research questions and hypothesis that will be examined. 3.2 delineates
the scope of this dissertation. 3.3 introduces the research methodologies that will be applied
in quantifying risks and determining the most appropriate decisions.
3.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS
In this section, a comprehensive list of research questions is provided. Due to the large
scope of the research questions, not all of them will be addressed in this dissertation. Q1
is qualitatively investigated in chapter 5. Q2 is qualitatively studied in section 6.1. Q3.1-
Q3.8 will be tested by three hypothesis in 3.1.2 quantitatively. Other research questions will
considered in future research.
3.1.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
(Q1). What are risks and mitigation strategies in each spectrum sharing method?
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(Q1.1) Identify risks for each sharing method.
(Q1.2) Map risk and mitigation strategies to each sharing method.
(Q2). What are spectrum entrants' decision criteria? What are attributes that impact
spectrum entrants' decision?
(Q2.1) Identify spectrum entrants' criteria.
(Q2.2) Identify attributes that impact spectrum entrants' choices.
(Q3). Quantify risks and mitigation strategies with dierent spectrum entrants' decision
criteria.
(Q3.1) What is the expected cost that each spectrum usage method requires under
dierent scenarios?
(Q3.2) What is the projected revenue that each spectrum usage method brings
under dierent scenarios?
(Q3.3) What is the capacity that each spectrum usage method can get under dif-
ferent scenarios?
(Q3.4) How does application type impact spectrum entrants' choices?
(Q3.5) How does geographic area impact spectrum entrants' decisions?
(Q3.6) How does spectrum entrants' awareness of spectrum utilization situation
impact their choices?
(Q3.7) How does operation duration impact spectrum entrants' decision?
(Q3.8) What is the value of mitigation strategies?
(Q3.9) How does enforcement impact on spectrum entrants' decisions?
(Q3.10) How does spectrum entrants' risk attitude impact their decisions?
(Q3.11) What is the impact on spectrum utilization from spectrum entrants' choices?
3.1.2 HYPOTHESIS
In order to answer research questions Q3.1-Q3.8, a decision and risk model is build and
described in chapter 6. Following three hypothesis will be quantitatively tested by the
decision and risk model in chapter 7.
(H1). QoS levels and risks change in diverse situations:
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(1) Dierent spectrum usage methods
(2) Location: urban/rural
(3) Capacity requirement: time varying/constant
(H2). Spectrum entrants have dierent expected prots and monetary risks under diverse
situations:
(1) Dierent spectrum usage models
(2) Location: urban/rural
(3) Operation duration:short/long
(4) Prot requirement: urban/rural large/small coverage
(H3). Spectrum entrants have dierent choices in diverse situations:
(1) Location: urban/rural
(2) Operation duration:short/long
(3) Capacity requirement: time varying/constant
(4) Risk awareness
(4-1) Risk awareness
(4-2) Risk unawareness
(5) Distinct decision criteria:
(5-1) Prot maximization
(5-2) QoS Risk minimization
(5-3) Mixed decision criteria
Following table summarizes the correspondence of hypothesis with the comprehensive
research question list.
Table 1: Correspondence between hypothesis and research questions
Proposed research for this dissertation Research questions
H1 Q3.1, Q3.2, Q 3.8
H2 Q3.3
H3 Q3.4, Q3.5, Q3.6, Q3.7
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3.2 SCOPE OF THE DISSERTATION
Factors such as application types, location, frequency bands, decision criteria, etc, impact
spectrum entrants' choices of spectrum usage method. In this dissertation, only several cases
will be tested under the proposed decision and risk framework. Specically, spectrum usage
methods that considered in this dissertation include:
 Primary usage (6 MHz in 700 MHz band Block A: 698-704 MHz)
 Cooperative through spectrum trading (6 MHz in 700 MHz band Block A: 698-704 MHz)
 CR based DSA (6 MHz in 700 MHz band Block A: 698-704 MHz)
 TVWS (692-698 MHz)
 ISM (2400-2500MHz)
 ASA (3.5 GHz)
 Mixed strategies
They will be introduced in detail in chapter 4.
Additionally, only two types of risks will be quantied: QoS risks and monetary risks.
It is assumed that the QoS risks in primary usage and quasi-static sharing comes from
license/contracts availability. On the contrary, the QoS risks in dynamic sharing comes from
the competition in access spectrum among PUs and SUs. Specically, in CR based DSA
and TVWS, both PUs and target SUs' trac will be considered; while in the unlicensed
bands, only SUs' trac will be considered. Competition among SUs are not considered in
the decision analysis, but are addressed in the sensitivity analysis.
Monetary risks consider costs, revenue, and value of mitigation strategies. Costs model
is based on each spectrum sharing method, operating frequency, and target coverage. Two
types of revenue functions are considered. For primary usage and quasi-static sharing, the
revenue is based on the service demand. For dynamic sharing, the revenue is based on both
the expected throughput (QoS level) and service demand. Two types of demand are ap-
plied in analysis. The rst one assumes that spectrum entrants will have constant demand
for the entire operation. The second one assumes that the demand linearly decreases with
the increase of price. In addition, the cost and demand are assumed to be uniformly dis-
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tributed across the geographic coverage. When quantifying mitigation strategies, two types
of mitigation strategies are considered: lease spectrum/infrastructure, and improve.
When estimating throughput for dynamic sharing, it is assumed that spectrum users
with higher priority (PUs) have the right to preempt spectrum users with lower priority
(SUs). Spectrum users within the same priority are served as First In First Out (FIFO).
Moreover, the unit of arrival for TV broadcaster is program, and unit for other services'
arrivals are packets. Two types of arrival process are considered: time-varying and con-
stant arrival, in other to capture both human-centered applications and machine-to-machine
communications. In order to simplify the calculation, it is assumed that the base station
coverage is circular. Furthermore, spectrum holes are assumed to be exogenous, although
we argued that spectrum holes should be endogenous. Exogenous spectrum holes means the
spectrum hole is solely created by PUs' usage. SUs do not have controls or impact the quan-
tity of spectrum holes. This is not realistic, since PUs' may transmitting meaningless signal
to deter SUs' usage or SUs' can provide enough incentives to PUs in order to have more
spectrum access opportunity. Therefore, we argue that spectrum holes should be endoge-
nous. That means spectrum hole are created by bilateral negotiation between PUs and SUs.
However, the creating of endogenous holes that involves business strategies, negotiations,
and competition, complicates the model. Therefore, in this dissertation, the spectrum hole
is simplied by assuming they are created by PUs' wireless trac only. All the parameters
that are applied in the numerical results analysis are summarized in section 7.2.2.
Two locations will be investigated: a urban area and a rural area. It is assumed that the
population is higher in the urban area than in the rural area. Therefore, the wireless service
trac is more intense in the urban than in the rural place.
The best spectrum usage choice is determined for the spectrum entrant that aims at
providing broadband services who has a time-varying wireless trac. Therefore, the revenue
is based on data services instead of voice. In the sensitivity analysis, other types of spectrum
entrants' (such as spectrum entrants with constant wireless trac and event support services)
choices are briey addressed. Moreover, the best option is determined for two types of risk
attitudes: risk awareness and risk unawareness. In the st case, spectrum entrants ignore
the risk and consider the best case scenario. For example, the expected QoS level is the
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desired one in all cases, and the demand is high and constant all the time. In the second
case, spectrum entrants consider potential risks in demand, throughput, and the value of
mitigation strategies. Within each risk attitude, three decision criteria are applied: prot
maximization, QoS risk minimization, and mixed strategies. Furthermore, spectrum entrants
are assumed to be risk-neutral. Although most people are not risk-neutral in the reality, it
is reasonable to assume the decision maker is risk-neutral especially for large corporations
where the amount of money involved in a decision is relatively small compared to their total
assets [92].
Limitations of this dissertation: (1) According to Okumura Hata propagation model,
the path loss is less in the rural than in the urban. Therefore, the coverage of the base
station with the same transmission power is larger in the rural than in the urban area.
However, this dissertation assumes the coverage is the same for both urban and rural area
when they have the same device and transmission power level. (2) In the queueing model,
it is assumed that spectrum users can detect others' service and coordinate with each other
perfectly. The greedy behavior and interference due to imperfect detection and wireless
channels are ignored. This can be improved by replacing the existing static service rate to
a function of service rate that depends on distance. (3) Service demand that changes with
price is ignored. However, the sensitivity analysis provides the results with dierent price
and same amount of demand. (4) The spectrum license is auctioned in the real world, so
bidding strategies and other spectrum entrants' behaviors impact the spectrum price. It is
ignored in this dissertation. The spectrum price is considered as a xed number. However,
the availability of license/contract reect the diculties in obtaining the license/contract.
(5) When calculating cost and revenues, only spectrum related factors are considered. Other
factors are outside the scope of the paper. For example, cost of marketing and development
are not considered. Impact for spectrum usage from policy change are also ignored. (6) It is
assumed that spectrum entrants select a specic spectrum usage method to maximize their
utility. Behavior such as deter others' usage, collusion in the auction, etc are ignored. (7)
The queueing model that applied in this dissertation is preemptive resume, that means SUs
resume from the point where is was preempted. However, there are also other services that
will repeat the entire transmission. In this case, preemptive repeat queue should be applied.
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3.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES
When quantifying risks and investigating spectrum entrants' decisions, three research method-
ologies are adopted, namely decision models introduced in section 3.3.1, real options illus-
trated in section 3.3.2, and queueing models described in section 3.3.3.
3.3.1 DECISION MODEL
This section provides an overview of decision model by answering three questions: (1) What
are basic elements of decision models? (2) How to create a decision model? (3) What are
key issues in decision models?
3.3.1.1 ELEMENTS OF DECISION MODEL Four basic elements make up a de-
cision model: (1) values and objectives; (2) decisions to make; (3) uncertain events; and (4)
consequences [92].
Value is that which matters to decision makers. Dierent decision makers value each
item dierently. For example, solving a specic scientic question brings high value to a
scientist, while earning prots and acquiring a control of a company provide great value
to an investor. An objective is a specic thing that an individual or an entity wants to
achieve. A decision makers' value is formed by all of his or her objectives. An important
concept that accompany value and objectives is decision context. It is the setting in which
decision occurs. For example, a decision context may be deciding what stock to buy, in which
case the appropriate objective could be earning prots. It is important because the decision
context determines what objectives need to be considered. In the meanwhile, thinking about
objectives in advance helps individuals to be prepared when decision context appears [92].
When there are multiple alternatives, a decision must be made. In many cases, in
stead of one single decision, there are several sequential decisions. When a decision situation
requires sequential decisions, it is better for the decision maker to consider them when making
immediate decisions, since a future decision may largely depend on the initial decision [92].
What makes a decision problem even more complicated is many important decisions
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have to be made with uncertainty about the future. In other words, the decision maker
does not know what will happen in the future or what the nal outcome will be. The larger
the number of uncertain events, the more dicult the decision making process is. Like
sequential decisions, more than one uncertainty may be involved in a decision situation, and
they are interdependent. Therefore, a decision maker must consider uncertain events and
their inter-dependency when making decisions [92].
The consequence occurs after the last decision has been made and the last uncertainty
has been resolved. There may be more than one consequence if the decision context requires
multiple objectives. In a recruit process, the nal consequence is hiring the best available
person; while in a business project, the nal consequence may be the \net value" that
accounts for cash inows and outows happen during the time of decision making process
[92].
3.3.1.2 CREATING A DECISION MODEL Three fundamental steps are involved
in creating a decision model. The rst step is to identify and structure the values and objec-
tives. This step requires decision makers to list issues that matter to the individual or the
organization. Examples for single objectives include prot maximization, loss minimization,
etc. An individual or an organization may also have multiple conicting objectives. For
instance, the company may want to maximize the nancial return of an investment while
minimize the chance of losing money [92].
The second step is using a logical framework to construct all the elements of the decision
context. Two tools can be applied to fulll this purpose: inuence diagrams and decision
trees. Inuence diagrams provide graphical view of the decision context. Dierent shapes
represent dierent decision elements: rectangles represent decisions, ovals represent chance
events (uncertainties), rectangles with rounded corners represent a mathematical calculation
or a constant value. These three shapes are referred to as nodes. Nodes are connected
by arrows or arcs. Arcs represent either relevance or sequence, while the meaning of an
arrow is determined by the context. The node at the beginning of an arc or an arrow is
called predecessor and the node at the end of an arc or an arrow is called successor. The
inuence diagrams use a simple way to display a decision's basic structure, which ease the
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communication and conceptualization. However, they hide many of the details that are
needed in order to make a decision [92].
Decision trees, on the other hand, display more of the details. As in inuence diagrams,
dierent shapes are adopted in the decision trees: squares represent decisions to be made, and
circles represent chance events (uncertainties). Branches that originate from a square denotes
available choices; and branches emanating from a circle represent the possible outcomes.
Consequence locates at the ends of branches. There are three requirements when constructing
a decision tree. First, successors of a decision node must be so that the decision maker can
choose only one option. Second, chance nodes must be mutually exclusive and collectively
exhaustive. Third, a decision tree must contain all possible paths that the decision maker may
follow. At the end of each branch, all relevant consequences are listed. While providing more
information, the decision trees grows exponentially with possible choices and uncertainties
that intense the level of complexity [92].
After constructing objectives and a logical framework, the last step is to rene and spec-
ify the denition of all the elements of the decision model. First, all the available alternatives
have to be precisely dened. Second, the decision maker must list all uncertainties and come
up with plans on how to quantify them. Last but not least, consequences in terms of objec-
tives must be measurable. How to measure objectives with dierent dimensions, objectives
of conict interests, and the impact from uncertain events are essential to a decision model,
and will be discussed in the next section [92].
3.3.1.3 KEY ISSUES IN DECISION MODELS Three key issues are presented in
this section: utility functions, decision makers' risk attitudes, and sensitivity analysis. The
main reason for using a utility function instead of monetary return is to capture decision
makers' attitudes about risk, return, and objectives with dierent dimensions. As discussed
above, decision makers may have objectives such as achieving high returns and minimizing
risks. In this case, they can apply an Additive Preference Model to deal with the conicting
objectives. In the Additive Preference Model, a utility score, (U1(x1);    ; Um(xm)), will be
calculated for each individual objective, (x1;    ; xm). Then they will be summed up with
dierent weights, (k1;    ; km;
Pm
i=1 ki = 1), according to the importance of each objective
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as [92]:
U(x1;    ; xm) = k1  U1(x1) +   + km  Um(xm)
=
mX
i=1
kiUi(xi)
(3.1)
There are three types of risk attitudes: risk-seeking, risk-averse, and risk-neutral. Gen-
erally speaking, an individual who would trade a gamble for a sure amount that is less than
the expected value of the gamble indicates a risk-seeking behavior. His utility is captured
by a convex function. On the other hand, an individual who purchase insurance indicates a
risk-averse behavior. His utility is captured by a concave function. Finally, the utility func-
tion for risk-neutral is a simple straight line. For this type of person, maximizing monetary
return is the same as maximize utility. Although most people are not risk-neutral in the
reality, it is reasonable to assume the decision maker is risk-neutral especially for large cor-
porations where the amount of money involved in a decision is relatively small compared to
their total assets. In this dissertation, it is assumed that all decision makers are risk-neutral
[92].
The purpose of conducting sensitivity analysis is to nd out which factors matter to the
outcomes and how much dierence they can make. It is central to the constructing and
solving decisions models by decision-analysis techniques, since it can lead the decision maker
to reconsider the nature of the problem. For example, when we assume decision makers are
risk-neutral, the expected monetary values (EMVs) can be a rst-cut analysis. However,
there may be situations that decision makers' risk attitude largely impacts the consequence.
In this case, the assumption of risk-neutral is not a good choice. The decision maker have
to reconsider how to capture the risk attitude in the model [92].
3.3.2 REAL OPTIONS
Uncertainties in the investment life cycle complicate the decision making process. Instead
of passively taking the uncertainties, corporations have the right to delay, expand, contract,
or abandon a project with a given cost or salvage value at some future date. Real options is
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the collection of these strategies to cope with the unexpected market changes and competi-
tions [93]. In the spectrum usage domain, spectrum entrants face changing situations such
as spectrum utilization environment, regulatory rules, and service demands. As a decision
maker, they have the right to switch among spectrum usage methods, lease spectrum and
infrastructure to others when prots decrease, acquire more spectrum by contract and CR
base DSA when the current bandwidth can hardly meet the soaring demand, etc. Conse-
quently, it is important to consider the value of real options when making spectrum usage
decisions. This section provides an introduction on real options, categories of options, and
how to quantify the value of real options.
3.3.2.1 WHAT ARE REAL OPTIONS? As described in section 3.3.1, monetary
gain can be an objective in the decision model. It is traditionally evaluated by discounted-
cash-ow (DCF) approach, such as net-present value (NPV) rule. The DCF approach as-
sumes that the decision maker passively commits to a static operating strategy throughout
the entire life cycle of the investment. In other words, the individual or the organization
does not change their strategies when risks occur and when uncertainties are resolved. It
does not capture the management's exibility which aims at adapting to dierent situations
and revise decisions in response to unexpected situations [94].
Real options, in contrast, target quantifying the value of management's exibility. This
management's exibility is linked to nancial options, which is a derivative instrument for a
future transaction on an asset. There are two types of options: call options and put options.
Entities that estimate the asset that may decrease in value will write a call option (short
call). The buyer of the call option (long call) has the right, but not obligation, to acquire the
underlying asset by paying a predetermined price, called strike price. Entities that anticipate
the asset may increase in value will write a put option (short put). The buyer of the put
option (long put) has the right, but not obligation, to sell the underlying asset and receive
the strike price.
Many of the real options occur naturally, while others may be planned and built in
at extra cost. Like nancial options, an individual or an organization has the right but not
obligations to exercise real options. They are only exercised when it is protable to do so [95].
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This asymmetry provides entities instrument to mitigate risks and cope with uncertainties,
which is the value of real options [96].
3.3.2.2 CATEGORIES OF REAL OPTIONS Real options may be divided into
three categories: investment/growth options; deferral/learning options; and disinvestment/shrinkage
options. Investment/growth options include (1) scale up option: the option to scale up
through sequential investments when demand and prots increase; (2) switch-up option: the
option to upgrade to the next generation of the product or technology or switch to technol-
ogy and product that lead to higher prots; (3) scope-up option: happen when a company's
initial investment provides it a leeway to enter another industry cost-eectively [93].
The most important deferral/learning options, also called study/start options, is delay.
It means an individual and an organization has the option to wait until more information or
skill is acquired. For example, a company may make an investment after they have a clear
view of service demands. Another example is that a pharmaceutical rm may conduct several
phases of experimentation with the drug compound before seeking regulatory approval and
going to market [93].
A company also has disinvestment/shrinkage options when prots reduce. Three types of
options exist inside this category: (1) scale-down option: the option to shrink or shut down
a project before completion due to the changes in the expected payos; (2) switch-down
option: the option to switch to more cost-eective technology and products; (3) scope-down
option: the option to decrease or even abandon the project [93].
3.3.2.3 QUANTIFYING REAL OPTIONS As mentioned above, real options stem
from options in nancial markets. In order to reveal how to quantify real options, it is
necessary to trace back to the early origin of evaluating options in the nancial markets.
Louis Bachelier is considered as the rst person that uses advanced mathematics in the study
of nance. In [97], he mentions \l'esprance mathmatique du spculateur est nulle". In English
it means that in average a speculator's average gain or loss should be zero, mathematical
zero. So, the value of the option is the speculator's expected gain or loss.
This sentence can be translated in math as follows. If we denote the value of an option
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by H(X;Y; T ) as the value that a speculator can gain by exchanging asset X for asset Y at
time T in the future, the statement that the mathematical expectation of a speculator is
zeros means:
H(X; Y; T )  e T
Z 1
Y
(u  Y )	(u;X; Y; T )du = 0 (3.2)
In 3.2, e T
R1
Y
(u   Y )	(u;X; Y; T )du is the discounted expected value of the gain made
by exchanging asset X for asset Y at time T in the future. In the context of a call option
on a share, X is the value of a share, Y is the exercise price and T is the exercise time.
	(u;X; Y; T ) is a time dependent Probability Density Function (PDF) which controls how
the values of X and Y compare at time T. The integration provides the expected value of
the dierence of (u   Y ) when u  Y . It is the expected benet of making the exchange.
e T is the discount factor. Clearly, the value of option H(X; Y; T ) can be written as:
H(X; Y; T ) = e T
Z 1
Y
(u  Y )	(u;X; Y; T )du (3.3)
In [97], the PDF for the value of the asset subject to the speculation at the relevant time
in the future was Gaussian. This means Bachelier assumed that the value of the underlying
assets followed a Brownian motion. Economists since have evolved on this subject. The most
commonly used PDF in the nancial market is a time dependent lognormal distribution. In
this dissertation, the PDF of the demand will be applied when calculating the value of the
options.
3.3.3 QUEUEING SYSTEMS
A queueing system is a system in which items arrive for service, wait for service if it is
not immediately served, and leave the system after being served [98]. The word \item" is
a generic term. It could refer to customers in a bank, parts in a manufacturing factory,
packets in the wireless communication networks, etc. The word \service" generally means
being processed. The service in the bank could mean depositing and withdrawing money,
the process in a manufacturing factory could be smelting and forging, and the process in
wireless communications domain could mean transmitting and receiving [99].
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3.3.3.1 FUNDAMENTALS OF QUEUEING SYSTEMS In most cases, ve basic
characteristics are needed in order to precisely dene a queueing system: (1) Arrival pattern
of customers measured by the average number of arrivals per unit of time or the inter arrival
time; (2) Service pattern of servers measured by the average number of customers served per
unit of time or required service time; (3) Number of servers describes the number of parallel
service stations; (4) System capacity is the physical limitation of the waiting room for a
queue; (5) Queueing discipline is the manner by which customers are selected for service in
a queue [100].
Accordingly, Kendall's notation uses a serie of symbols and slashes such as A/B/X/Y/Z
to describe a queueing system based on above ve characteristics. Table 2 summarizes the
meaning of each parameter with examples. In most of the time, only rst three symbols,
A/B/X is mentioned. Then it is assumed that the system capacity is innite and the queueing
discipline is FIFO [100].
Table 2: Kendall's Notation
Characteristics Explanation Examples
A Interarrival-time distribution M-Exponential, Ek-Erlang type k (K=1,2)
B Service-time distribution D-Deterministic, G-General
X Number of parallel servers 1,2,   ,1
Y Restriction on system capacity 1,2,    , 1
Z Queue discipline FIFO, LIFO-Last In First Out
3.3.3.2 PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS There are six essential parameters when
analyzing queueing system [101].
1. Probability of the number of jobs in the system (k): important probabilities include
the probability that the server is idle (0), the probability that a job is forced to join a
queue (c) where c is the number of servers, and the probability that a job is dropped
(k) where k is the system capacity.
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2. Utilization ():  < 1 is the condition required for a stationary behavior. In other words,
the system is stable when the average number of jobs that arrives in a unit of time is less
than the average number of jobs that can be serviced by the system. In a single server
system, the utilization, , is the fraction of the time in which the server is occupied.
When there is no limit on the number of jobs in the single server system, the utilization
is calculated as
 =
mean service time
mean interarrival time
=
arrival rate
service rate
=


(3.4)
The utilization of a multiple servers system is given by
 =

c
(3.5)
3. Response Time (T ): also known as the sojourn time, is the total time that a job spends
in the queueing system. It includes both service time and waiting time.
4. Waiting Time (W ): The waiting time is the time that a job spends in a queue waiting
to be serviced.
5. Queue Length (Q): is the number of jobs in the queue. It can be calculated by Little's
theorem as
Q = W: (3.6)
6. Number of Jobs in the Systems (K): calculates the average number of jobs in the system
as
K =
1X
k=1
k  k =  T: (3.7)
3.3.3.3 M/G/C QUEUE M/G/C is a type of queueing system where customers arrive
according to a Poisson process with rate , the service time follows general distribution with
mean , and the total number of parallel servers is C. Therefore, one customer can be served
immediately after arriving when there are less than C other customers present in the system.
Otherwise, the customer has to wait in a queue with innite capacity and it will be served
based on FIFO discipline. Although M/G/C queueing system only relaxes one condition from
M/M/C queue, which is the service time distribution, the calculation complexity changes
dramatically. There is no analytically results for steady state M/G/C queue. Therefore, the
probability that k (k = 1; 2;    ; C) servers are busy can be approximated by simulation.
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3.3.3.4 PRIORITY QUEUE In priority queue, users are assigned with dierent pri-
ority classes (1; 2;    ; k). In contrast to FIFO, users with higher class have higher priority
when access the server. The two well-known priority disciplines are non-preemptive and
preemptive. Under the non-preemptive rule, if a higher priority unit arrives when a lower
priority unit is being served, the higher priority unit waits until the lower priority unit com-
pletes its service. In preemptive priority discipline, if a higher priority unit arrives when
a lower priority unit is being served, the higher priority unit has the right of replacing the
lower priority unit from service [102]. Customers in the same priority class is being served
as FIFO.
After interrupted by higher priority unit, the lower priority unit on its re-entry may either
(1) resume service from the point where it was preempted, called \preemptive resume" or
(2) repeat the service, called \preemptive repeat" [103]. This dissertation adopts preemptive
resume as priority queueing discipline. It is because PUs have the rights to occupy the
licensed spectrum whenever needed. Further, we assume that SUs have enough buer to
save incomplete services and capability to track their transmissions.
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4.0 SPECTRUM SHARING METHODS
There are many ways to categorize spectrum usage methods. Depending on explicit co-
ordination between PUs and SUs, spectrum sharing can be divided into cooperative and
non-cooperative sharing [104]. Examples of cooperative sharing include spectrum trading
and Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs). Examples of non-cooperative sharing
include unlicensed usage and opportunistic sharing. Depending on the rights holders' hierar-
chy, spectrum sharing can be divided into non-subordinate sharing and subordinate sharing.
Sharing among same type of right holders is non-subordinate sharing, such as wireless Local
Area Network (WLAN) in ISM bands and Commercial Mobile Radio Services (CMRS) in
licensed bands. Sharing between PUs and SUs is subordinate sharing. Examples include
spectrum sharing in TV broadcast bands and federal-commercial sharing in 1755-1850 MHz
[105].
In this dissertation, the spectrum usage methods are divided into three categories accord-
ing to the dynamics of spectrum sharing: primary usage, quasi-static sharing, and dynamic
sharing. The reason for this categorization approach is that dierent spectrum usage meth-
ods in the same group use identical quantication methodology for calculating risks and
revenues. This section introduces spectrum sharing methods that are considered in this
dissertation in detail.
4.1 PRIMARY USAGE
Once the spectrum entrant obtains an FCC issued license, he has the exclusive usage right for
operating on the licensed bands during the permitted time periods at assigned geographic
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areas. Accordingly, bandwidth, operation duration, location and coverage determine the
price for the spectrum bands. Selected auctions for Pittsburgh (PA), Washington D.C. and
New York (NY) are summarized in Appendix A. From the table, several observations can
be draw:
 Spectrum license price increases with population.
 Broadband worth much more than narrow band.
 The average license period is 10 years and the majority of them are renewable.
 There is construction requirements for licensees in terms of geographic and population
coverage and services.
All radio licenses are assigned based on area. Dierent area segmentation methods are
applied in dierent types of licenses. Five of them are listed here since they are closely
related to the auction summarized in Appendix A: the Basic Trading Areas (BTA)1, the
Major Economic Areas (MEA)2, the Regional Economic Areas (REA)3, Cellular Market
Areas (CMA)4, the Economic Area (EA)5.
4.2 QUASI-STATIC SHARING
In quasi-static sharing, spectrum entrants do not have the exclusive usage right in accessing
the spectrum. However, their opportunities in spectrum access is reserved. This is achieved
by PUs' and SUs' cooperation in both spatial and temporal domain. Two examples will
1Basic Trading Areas delineated by the Rand McNally 1992 Commercial Atlas & Marketing Guide, 123rd
Edition, at pages 38-39; extended and revised by the Federal Communications Commission, 59 FR 46195
(September 7, 1994)
2Major Economic Areas delineated by the Federal Communications Commission, 62 FR 9636 (March 3,
1997)
3Regional Economic Areas delineated by the Federal Communications Commission, 62 FR 9636 (March
3, 1997)
4Cellular Market Areas listed by the Federal Communications Commission, DA 92-109 (January 24,
1992), 7 FCC Rcd 742 (1992)
5Economic Areas delineated by the Regional Economic Analysis Division, Bureau of Economic Analysis,
U.S. Department of Commerce February 1995 and extended by the Federal Communications Commission,
62 FR 9636 (March 3, 1997)
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be investigated in this dissertation for quasi-static spectrum sharing: cooperative spectrum
sharing through trading and ASA.
4.2.1 COOPERATIVE SPECTRUM SHARING THROUGH TRADING
The FCC released the rst Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
to facilitate spectrum access through the use of spectrum leasing agreement in 2003 [106].
It allows PUs to lease some or all of the spectrum usage rights associated with their licenses
to third parties. These leasing agreements need to be submitted to the FCC at least 10
or 21 days (depending on leasing duration) before eective. The second Report and Order
provides immediate processing, such as overnight approval, for certain qualied spectrum
leasing arrangement [107].
According to the FCC's denition, there are two types of spectrum leasing agreements:
spectrum manager lease and de facto transfer lease. Under the the spectrum manager lease,
both de jure and de facto control over the leased spectrum are retained by SUs during leasing
period. That means SUs have the rights to dene their own spectrum usage parameters.
On the contrary, under de facto transfer, SUs only obtain the de facto control of the leased
spectrum while PUs keep the de jure control over it. In this case, SUs have to follow
spectrum sharing etiquette that determined by PUs. Both spectrum leasing agreements
have two options: short-term lease and long-term lease. A short-term lease is limited to one
year, and a long-term lease last more than one year.
Ideally, we could track the dierence between spectrum leasing and auction value if we
know how much SUs pay for spectrum leasing. Unfortunately, spectrum leases are considered
as private transactions and the information is generally not available. The accessible infor-
mation captures the number of spectrum leasing arrangement in each year, which provide a
sense on spectrum leasing availability. Appendix C summarized number of spectrum leasing
under selected spectrum blocks.
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4.2.2 ASA
The second type of quasi-static sharing is ASA. The key feature of ASA is to ensure a
predictable QoS for spectrum users. When setting up the ASA arrangement, the following
steps need to be followed: (1) PUs report the conditions under which ASA will be facilitated;
(2) the regulator assesses the relevant conditions of the PUs' usage as reported in step (1);
(3) the regulator establishes an ASA licensing process; (4) ASA licensees (SUs) operate
according to ASA terms; (5) when PUs need to access the spectrum used by SUs, they
must inform SUs by agreed means. Then SUs need to modify their transmission parameters
according to the conditions dened in ASA licenses [108, 109, 110].
One application of ASA could be spectrum sharing between federal and non-federal users
in federal bands. In July 2012, PCAST recommended the president to identify 1,000 MHz of
federal spectrum to share with non-federal users. It further suggested a three-tier hierarchical
sharing, in which federal primary systems have the highest priority and are protected from
harmful interference. Second tier users, referred to as Priority Access, must register their
deployments and receive some QoS protections. The FCC suggested eligible Priority Access
users could include hospitals, utilities, state and local governments, etc. In order to provide
a QoS guarantee, Priority Access users would only be permitted in areas and time slots
that experience little interference from PUs. The third tier users, called General Authorized
Access (GAA), opportunistically operate on the spectrum when above two types of users are
absent. Unlike the Priority Access, GAA do not have guarantee in spectrum access [24, 111].
Candidate bands for federal and non-federal sharing include Meteorological-Satellite (space-
to-earth) and Meteorological aids services on 1675-1710 MHz, federal government for xed
and mobile services in 1755-1780 MHz, Department of Defense Radar service in 3500-3650
MHz, and internationally reserved for radio altimeters in 4200-4220 MHz, 4380-4400 MHz
bands [26].
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4.3 DYNAMIC SHARING
The feature of dynamic sharing is that spectrum access opportunities are not reserved.
Moreover, there is no explicit cooperation requirements among SUs and between PUs and
SUs. Three types of dynamic sharing are considered in this dissertation: CR based DSA,
unlicensed usage in TVWS, and unlicensed usage in ISM bands.
4.3.1 CR BASED DSA
The goal of CR based DSA is to provide SUs with high bandwidth via heterogeneous archi-
tectures and DSA techniques. The full realization of CR based DSA will lead to opportunistic
spectrum sharing in any frequency, where SUs nd idle bands, use it optimally, and then va-
cate the bands for others [111]. When it happens in the licensed bands, SUs should transmit
on non-interfering basis. In other words, SUs operate when PUs are absent and terminate
their operation upon PUs' arrival. There are four major functions for sensing based DSA
[7]:
 Spectrum sensing: detecting unused frequency bands.
 Spectrum management: identifying the best available frequency bands for specic com-
munication requirements.
 Spectrum mobility: maintaining seamless communication during the transition to dier-
ent frequency bands.
 Spectrum sharing: supporting fairness in spectrum sharing with other opportunistic
users.
IEEE P1900.5, published in January 2012, is the standard for DSA networks. It de-
nes policy-based control architectures for the regulator, the operator, the user, and the
network equipment manufacturer. It also denes policy language requirements on function-
ality and behaviors of DSA networks. The current standards on CR based DSA include
P1900.5.1, P1900.5.a, and P1900.5.2. P1900.5.1 provides the policy language requirements
of IEEE 1900.5, including applications, signaling plan, and technical analysis that developed
by Modeling Language for Mobility Work Group (MLM-WG). P1900.5.a is an amendment
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to the existing P1900.5. It denes the interface between policy architecture and components.
P1900.5.2 designs methodologies for modeling spectrum consumption of any type of radio
frequency spectrum usage [112].
From 2001, the FCC has adopted changes to the equipment authorization rules in order
to accommodate the development of SDR and CR. As stated by the FCC, CR based DSA
systems are allowed and have already been applied in cellular radio system, real time net-
work control, and WLAN. However, these usages limit CR to PUs' own licensed bands and
unlicensed bands. SUs are not allowed to opportunistically access the licensed bands due
to potential interference and system failure [111]. Because of its merits, this dissertation
includes CR based DSA as a spectrum usage model and analyzes situations that are suitable
for it.
4.3.2 TVWS
In 2008, the FCC released the Second Report and Order [20] to allow unlicensed devices
to transmit in the broadcast television spectrum at locations where licensed services are
absent. These unused TV channels are referred to as white spaces. In this document, the
FCC requires:
 All devices (except personal/portable devices operating in client mode), must have geo-
location capability and access the database to obtain a list of the permitted channels
before transmission. They also must have a capability to sense TV broadcasting and
wireless microphone signals, at levels as low as -114 dBm.
 Fixed devices can operate on any channel between 2 and 51, except channels 3,4, and
37, up to 4 Watts eective isotropic radiated power (EIRP). That is frequency bands
54-60 MHz, 76-88 MHz, 174-216 MHz, 470-608 MHz, 614-698 MHz. Similarly, personal
portable devices can operate on channels between 21 and 51, except channel 37, which
is frequency bands between 512-608 MHz, 614-698 MHz. The transmission power cap in
adjacent channels is 40 milliwatts, and for other channels is 100 milliwatts. Devices that
only rely on sensing and do not have geolocation and database access capabilities are
allowable, but they are subject to a much more rigorous set of tests and the maximum
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transmission power is 50 milliwatts instead of 100 milliwatts. All devices must limit
out-of-band emissions in the rst adjacent channel to a level 55 dB below the power level
in the channel they occupy.
 All devices must provide identifying information to the database for the sake of enforce-
ment. All devices must have adaptable power control in order to use the minimum power
to complete communications. All devices are subject to equipment certication by the
FCC Laboratory before implementation.
In 2010, the FCC released the nal rules for unlicensed usage in TV white space in the
Second Memorandum Opinion and Order [21]. The most signicant change is that the FCC
eliminated the sensing requirement for SUs with geo-location capability and the ability to
access the database. Moreover, the required in-band emission will be measured within 6 MHz
instead of 100 kHz. It also revised the attenuation level from 55 dB to 72.8 dB. They require
devices to re-check the database at least once a day after operation. Further, xed devices
are permitted to transmit up to 1 watt in power and may use an antenna that provides up
to 6 dBi of gain.
In 2012, the FCC further adjusted rules in the Third Memorandum Opinion and Order
[22]. They dened xed adjacent channel emission limit as the maximum power permitted
in a 6 MHz bandwidth minus 72.8 dB. It also slightly increases the maximum permissible
power spectral density (PSD) as described in table 3.
Table 3: Regulations in TVWS
Type of TV Bands Devices Power Limit (6 MHz) PSD Limit (100 kHz) Adjacent Channel Limit (100 kHz)
Fixed 30 dBm (1W) 12.6 dBm -42.8 dBm
Personal/Portable (adj. Channel) 16 dBm (40 mW) -1.4 dBm -56.8 dBm
Sensing Only 17 dBm ( 50 mW) -0.4 dBm -55.8 dBm
All other Personal/Portable 20 dBm (100 mW) 2.6 dBm -52.8 dBm
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4.3.3 ISM
The ISM bands are originally reserved for industrial, scientic, and medical purpose other
than communications 6. It includes frequency bands 902-928 MHz, 2400-2483.5 MHz, and
5725-5850 MHz. SUs with frequency hopping and Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS)
intentional radiators are permitted to operate under many requirements, including minimum
separate of hopping channels, average time of occupancy on any frequency band, and mini-
mum hopping frequencies. Regulations that related to transmission power are summarized
here 7: Maximum transmitter output power fed into the antenna is 30 dBm (1 Watt). Max-
imum EIRP is 36 dBm (4 watt). There are two exceptions for xed point-to-point link: (1)
no requirement on antenna gain in the 5.8 GHz; (2) in 2.4 GHz, system can increase antenna
gain above 36 dBm but for every 3 dBi increase of antenna gain, the system have to reduce
the transmit power by 1 dBm.
WiFi is the dominant technology for communications in ISM bands. As dened by Wi-Fi
Alliance [113], Wi-Fi is \wireless local area network (WLAN) products that are based on
the Institue of Electrical and Electronics Engineers(IEEE) 802.11 standards." The newest
standard 802.11n, introduced in 2009, increases the maximum single-channel data rate from
54 Mbps to over 100 Mbps. It also accommodates Multiple Input Multiple Output (MIMO)
mechanisms which allows up to 4 transmitter and receivers [114].
IEEE 802.11 is a set of physical and link layer specications created and maintained by
IEEE 802 group for implementing WLAN in 2.4, 3.6, 5 and 60 GHz bands. The medium
access control (MAC) technique in IEEE 802.11 is Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Colli-
sion Avoidance (CSMA/CA). Two major functions of CSMA/CA are carrier sense (\Listen
before talk") and collision avoidance. Carrier sense means before transmitting, a transmitter
must listen to the shared medium, such as wireless channels, to determine resource avail-
ability. It can only transmit when the channel is idle. Two techniques fulll the function of
collision avoidance. First, before transmitting, the transmitter could send a Request to Send
6ARTICLE 1 - Terms and Denitions (HTML). life.itu.ch. International Telecommunication Union. 19
October, 2009. 1.15. \industrial, scientic and medical (ISM) applications (of radio frequency energy): Op-
eration of equipment or appliances designed to generate and use locally radio frequency energy for industrial,
scientic, medical, domestic or similar purposes, excluding applications in the eld of telecommunications."
7Part 15, Subpart C, Sec. 15.247 Operation within the bands 902-928 MHz, 2400-2483.5 MHz, and
5725-5850 MHz.
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(RTS) message to the Access Point (AP). They can only transmit after receiving the Clear
to Send (CTS) message from the AP. Second, if the transmitter receives a acknowledgement
packet (ACK) from AP, it means there is no collision during transmission. Therefore, al-
though unlicensed bands do not require coordination among users, there are standards that
required \Listen before talk" in order to achieve mutual good performance [114].
4.4 MIXED STRATEGY
Spectrum choices are not limited to a single one of the options described above. Mixed strate-
gies that combine more than one spectrum choices are other options for SUs. For example,
SUs in cooperative sharing through trading may acquire one or more spectrum usage model
in the dynamic spectrum sharing in order to provide continuous services. Another example
is that PUs ooad trac from the core network to unlicensed spectrum. It is considered as
a cost-eective solution since licensing processes and spectrum expense are avoided. Mixed
strategy can be evaluated by real options approach, which is a future research direction.
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5.0 RISKS AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES
Each spectrum usage method that described above leads to unique risks portfolio, which
brings uncertainties to SUs. With proper mitigation strategies, these risks may not result in
system and business failure. Hence, the explicit understanding of risks and mitigation strate-
gies are essential for SUs. This section provides the lists of risks and mitigation strategies,
and then map them to each spectrum usage method.
5.1 RISKS
Risks can be divided into two broad categories: internal and external risks. Internal risks
are those that arise within the enterprise, while external risks are those that arise outside
the enterprise. Within each category, there are many factors that give rise to risks. Fac-
tors that bring on internal risks include: human factors, technological factors, and physical
factors. Human factors considers issues such as key sta being ill and unable to work and
strike actions. Technological factors are the unforeseen changes in technology that result
in products and services with better quality, lower price, and higher eciency in utilizing
resources. Physical factors are directly related to loss or damage to the physical property
of the enterprise. Factors that cause external risks include economic factors, natural and
environment factors, as well as political factors. Economic factors include customer demands
and competition for the product, service, and resource. Natural and environment factors are
unforeseen changes in climate and environments. Political factors means changes in regula-
tion, policy, and market viability [115]. In this dissertation, only factors that directly related
to spectrum usage and its impact will be considered, therefore human factors are outside the
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scope.
Common risk factors that are faced by every spectrum usage method are: (1) customer
demand: when spectrum entrants build out infrastructures and start providing services,
there are no guarantees on the service demand. Service demand may change with price,
application, location, and even marketing strategies. (2) technological risk: the development
of technology in telecommunication eld happens often, for instance, the cellular technology
evolved from GSM to OFDM. End users' enthusiasm in adopting new technology diminish
the value of legacy technology. (3) physical risk: as long as spectrum entrants have physical
properties, they have physical risks. In this specic case, physical properties include base
stations, transmitters, backhaul equipment, etc
Risk of competition stems from spectrum entrants' competition with their counterparts
in getting spectrum. Spectrum entrants cannot avoid competition risks, but they have strate-
gies to increase the chance of winning in the competition. The competition for primary usage
and quasi-static sharing comes from getting license and contracts. Competition in auctions
increases the license and contracts price. Spectrum entrants in dynamic sharing compete
for spectrum access opportunities. Sensors' performance and transmitters' capabilities de-
termine how well they can compete with their counterparts.
Natural and environment risks such as climate change and natural disasters are not con-
sidered here. The environment risks in this dissertation is the spectrum usage environment.
Specically, it is the interference level at regions where spectrum entrants operate. Spectrum
entrants that target for primary usage have less environment risks since the resource, spec-
trum, is reserved for their usage. The environment risk increase in the quasi-static sharing.
Since SUs have lower priority in access the spectrum than PUs, they may receive interference
from PUs. This risk increase even more in the dynamic sharing, since reservation and co-
operation are not required. Moreover, the interference level rise when heterogeneous devices
and applications operate in the same band.
Political risks come from regulatory actions and spectrum markets. License availabil-
ity is a decisive factor for primary usage and ASA licensees. This availability depends on
regulators' spectrum assignment and allocation, other wireless services and technologies per-
formance, and the licensing process. Market liquidity aects the operation of cooperative
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spectrum sharing through trading. Factors that aect liquidity include transaction costs,
quantity of supply and demand, number of market participants, spectrum market structure,
information ow, etc. Dynamic sharing are strongly aected by regulation, since the operable
channel, bandwidth, maximum transmission power, etc. are all determined by regulators.
Table 4 summarizes risks for each spectrum usage method. P represents primary usage,
C represents cooperative spectrum sharing through trading, A represents ASA, S represents
CR based DSA since it requires sensing, T represents TVWS, and I represents unlicensed
usage in ISM.
Table 4: Risks for each spectrum usage method
Risk Categories Risks P C A S T I
Economic Demand + + + + + +
Competition for spectrum license + +
Competition for spectrum leasing agreement +
Competition for spectrum access + + +
Technology Technology evolution + + + + + +
Physical Property loss and damage + + + + + +
Political Spectrum license availability + +
Spectrum market liquidity +
Action of regulatory body + + +
Environment Interference level + + +
5.2 MITIGATION STRATEGIES
Risks do not necessarily lead to system failure, since each sharing method has dierent
mitigation strategies to hedge risks. When we recognize spectrum usage as an engineering
investment, there are many types of mitigation strategies in the entire investment life cycle.
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For example, the project can be postponed to have better recognition of service demand;
rms can increase advertisement and improve customer relationships in order to enhance the
service penetration. Four mitigation strategies that are closely related to spectrum usage
are listed here.
 Switch: ideally, spectrum entrants can switch their spectrum usage methods with asso-
ciated costs. However, PUs have to obey the construction requirements that stated in
the license terms, thus switching is not possible for them.
 Expand: whenever current frequency bands cannot support service demand, spectrum
users have the capability to establish more base stations to increase the spectrum reuse
factor and then support more customers or provide higher service performance.
 Acquire spectrum: spectrum entrants also have the rights to acquire more spectrum when
their service demand cannot be met by current frequency bands. When acquiring more
spectrum, spectrum entrants may have extra expenditures on equipment and spectrum
access opportunities.
 Lease infrastructure: all spectrum choices can lease infrastructure when it is protable.
When spectrum users lease infrastructure, it is possible that they terminate their own ser-
vice permanently or they may restart providing wireless services when situation changes.
 Lease spectrum: in this dissertation, only PUs have the option to lease spectrum, since
they are the license owners. SUs in cooperative sharing through trading may be able
to sublease spectrum depending on the terms of spectrum leasing agreement, which is
outside the scope of this dissertation.
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Table 5: Mitigation Strategies for Each Spectrum Usage Method
Mitigation Strategies Primary usage Cooperative ASA CR based DSA TVWS Unlicensed
Switch + + + + +
Expand + + + + + +
Acquire spectrum + + + + + +
Lease infrastructure + + + + + +
Lease spectrum +
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6.0 DECISION AND RISK ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK
The basic tenet for this dissertation is to quantify spectrum access risks and analyze spectrum
entrants' decisions based on dierent incentives, limitations, risks, and mitigation strategies
embedded in each spectrum usage method. Section 6.1 identies factors that impact spec-
trum entrants' choices and decision criteria that will be tested in this dissertation. Section
6.2 describes the models to quantify QoS risks in terms of throughput and monetary risks
in terms of prots. In order to quantify risks, section 6.3 adopts queueing systems to deter-
mine expected throughput, and section 6.4 provides cost and revenue models for calculating
expected prots, as well as real options method to quantify the value of mitigation strategies.
6.1 DECISION CRITERIA
Factors that impact spectrum entrants' decisions are divided into two groups: incentives
and limitations. Incentives include target coverage, frequency bands, location, operation
duration, and capacity requirements. For example, machine to machine communication may
support elastic services, therefore it has lower capacity requirements and does not have to
operate in the peak hour. While spectrum entrants that plan to provide broadcast service
may prefer locations with high population density, and they are supposed to provide high
QoS levels all day long especially in peak hour. The limitation that considered in this
dissertation is budget limitation.
Besides incentives and limitations, spectrum entrants also have dierent criteria. For ex-
ample, prots maximization and risk minimization are two common decision criteria. There
are other decision criteria as well. For example, a spectrum entrant may choose a specic
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spectrum usage method for a service, and the goal is not to earn prots but keep up with
competitors' application development. In other cases, although providing a new service may
bring high risk in demand and even lose capital, by doing so spectrum users can occupy the
market and then leverage other services.
There are no established criteria for wireless service providers to choose a spectrum access
method, however [116] surveys customers' choices on cellphone service. As a cellphone service
provider, they generate revenues by services demand. Therefore, we adopt end users' decision
criteria and generalize them for spectrum entrants in a broader sense. In this dissertation,
only the following decision criteria will be tested:
 Prot maximization: means spectrum entrants prefer the spectrum usage method that
provides the highest prots.
 QoS risk minimization: means spectrum entrants prefer the spectrum usage method that
has the least risks in throughput.
 Mixed decision criteria with dierent weights: (1) weight for monetary risks is 0.70
(Wp = 0:70) and weight for QoS risk minimization is 0.30 (Wq = 0:30); (2) weight for
monetary risks is 0.30 (Wp = 0:30) and weight for QoS risk is 0.70 (Wq = 0:70). (3)
weight for monetary risks is 0.5 (Wp = 0:5) and weight for QoS risk is 0.50 (Wq = 0:5).
6.2 RISK ASSESSMENT
As stated in section 5, two types of risks will be quantied in this dissertation: QoS risks in
terms of throughput for dynamic sharing, as well as monetary risks for all spectrum entrants.
The risks are calculated as the fraction of the dierence between requirement and expected
value over the requirement. The following sections will describe the model for quantifying
these two types of risks in detail.
49
6.2.1 RISKS IN THROUGHPUT
The risks in throughput, RTmi , for spectrum entrant, i, in this dissertation, is calculated as
the fraction of the dierence between spectrum entrants' throughput requirement, TRji ; (j =
1; 2; 3), and estimated throughput value, Tmi , over the throughput requirement, as illustrated
in equation 6.1. When the expected throughput is larger than the requirement, the risk is
0. m represents the spectrum sharing method. The calculation of the expected throughput
in each spectrum usage method will be introduced in section 6.3.
RTmi =
8>><>>:
0; if TRj  Tmi
TRji   Tmi
TRj
; if TRj > T
m
i
(6.1)
From equation 6.1, it can seen that both expected throughput value and the requirement
impact the risk value. Therefore, two types of throughput requirements will be applied
to test the dierence. In the rst scenario, spectrum entrants' throughput requirement is
constant. Applications such as surveillance monitoring fall in this category. In this case, the
throughput requirement function, TR1i , can be expressed as:
TR1i = a (6.2)
In the second scenario, spectrum entrants' throughput requirement is a step function that
changes with time. It represents the scenario where spectrum entrants provide full service
during a period of time and limited service for the rest of the day. Cellular and broadband
services are candidates for the step function, since their trac has a pronounced diurnal
behavior. In this case, the throughput requirement, TR3i , can be modeled as a step function
and expressed as:
TR2i = a1f1(x) +   + anfn(x) (6.3)
where ai 2 R, fi(x) = 1 if x 2 [ai; bi) and 0 otherwise, for i = 1;    ; n:
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6.2.2 RISKS IN PROFITS
The risks in prots, RPmi , for spectrum entrant i, is calculated as the fraction of the dier-
ence between the prots requirement, PRi, and the expected prots, P
m
i , over the prots
requirement. When the expected prots is larger than the requirement, the risk in prots is
0. When the expected prot is negative, the risk in prots is 1. m represents the spectrum
sharing method. The model of calculating the expected prots for each spectrum usage
method will be introduced in section 6.4.
RPmi =
8><>:
0; if PRj  Pmi
PRi   Pmi
PRi
; if PRi > P
m
i
(6.4)
Only one type of prots requirement will be applied in this dissertation, where the prot
requirement is a constant value p. When p equals to 0, it means the spectrum entrant is
satised with the spectrum usage method as long as the revenue is no less than than cost.
PRi = p (6.5)
6.3 QUANTIFYING THROUGHPUT
We consider a radio network with M PUs and N SUs. QoS risks will be calculated in terms
of throughput for SUs in dynamic sharing. When the packet length is Li, the length of
overhead is Lohi , and the end-to-end delay is Di for SU, i, the throughput, Ti is calculated
by [117]
Ti =
Li + Loh
Di
(6.6)
Hence, the main concern is to calculate the end-to-end delay. As introduced in 6.3.1, the
end-to-end delay in this case is the sojourn time in the M/G/C queue. It equals the waiting
time in the queue plus the transmission time. Two scenarios will be analyzed in the M/G/C
queue. The rst scenario, described in section 6.3.1.1 considers unlicensed bands, in which
SUs are the only type of spectrum users. It is modeled by a single class M/G/C queue. In
the second scenario, there are both PUs and SUs in the same frequency band. Thus, PUs are
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assumed to be able to preempt the transmission of SUs. It is modeled by M/G/C priority
queue with preemptive resume, described in section 6.3.1.2.
Instead of steady-state behavior, this dissertation uses time-varying behavior of the ar-
rival rate for both PUs and SUs. It is because the steady-state behavior is far from the
reality for most of the frequency bands. Specically, as [56] shown, spectrum usage has a
pronounced diurnal and weekly pattern. Therefore, the end-to-end delay in dynamic sharing
is based on the time-varying model, introduced in 6.3.2.
6.3.1 M/G/C queueing model
In the M/G/C queueing model, the arrival process is Poisson and the service time follows a
general distribution. The number of available channels for spectrum users is C. The sojourn
time of a k-class (k = 1; 2) C-server system with queueing discipline d, arrival rate vector
(k)(k = p; s), and service rate vector (k)(k = p; s) is denoted by S(d; (k); (k); C). The
waiting time of a system with the same parameters is denoted by W (d; 
(k)
; (k); C). In this
paper, d is either FIFO or preemptive resume (PR).
In CR based DSA and unlicensed usage in ISM bands, spectrum users' packets arrival
and service rates are applied. In TVWS, PUs are TV broadcasters, therefore the arrival
and service rate is the rate for a program. SUs' arrival and services rates are based on
packets. S() is the end-to-end delay for SUs. The estimated throughput is calculated as
packet length divided by S(). W () and S() will be calculated in single class and preemptive
resume scenarios.
6.3.1.1 Single class The single class M/G/C queueing model assumes that all N SUs
are served as FIFO and,
 The arrival of each SU's packets is Poisson distributed with arrival rate i(1  i  N),
and is independent of each other. The total arrival rate s =
PN
i=1 i, since the sum of
Poisson distribution is still Poisson distribution.
 The service time for SU, i, is exponentially distributed with rate i(1  i  N).
 All channels are statistically identical.
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Let S be a random variable denoting service time. The rst and second moment of the average
service time are E[S] and E[S2], respectively. The mean waiting time W (FIFO; 
(k)
; (k); C)
is approximated by [118] as
W (FIFO; 
(k)
; (k); C) 
Cs E[S
2](E[S])C 1p0()
2(C   1)!(C   sE[S])2 ; (6.7)
where  is the utilization of C channels, given by
 =
sE[S]
C
; (6.8)
and p0() is the probability that the queue is empty, given by
p0() = [
C 1X
i=0
(C)i
i!
+
(C)C
C!(1  ) ]
 1 (6.9)
6.3.1.2 Preemptive resume There are two dierent priority classes: PUs have the
highest priority and all SUs belong to the lower one. PUs are able to preempt the transmis-
sion of SUs. Spectrum users within the same priority class follow the FIFO discipline. When
SUs' transmission is preempted by PUs, they will be taken up into the queue and transmit
after PUs nish their services. CR based DSA and spectrum sharing in TVWS fall in this
category. The trac is modeled by M/G/C preemptive resume system that,
 The arrival for each spectrum user is Poisson process, with mean rate i, and independent
of each other. The sum of Poisson process is still Poisson. Therefore, p =
PM
i=0 i and
s =
PN
i=0 i.
 We use (k) to denote the sum of the rst k(k = p; s) priorities of i. (p) = p is the
sum of all arrival rates for, the highest priority, PUs. (s) = p + s is the sum of all
arrival rates for, the rst two highest priorities, PUs and SUs.
 The service time for each spectrum user, i, is generally distributed with average service
rates per channel i.
 The overall mean service rate of the k highest priority levels, weighted by arrival rates,
will be denoted by (k) =
1Pk
j=1
j
j
Pk
i=1 i.
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 To ensure the existence of nite waiting times for the k priority classes, it is also assume
that the total trac intensity satises (k) =
Pk
i=1(
i
Ci
) < 1.
 All channels are statistically identical.
The primary concern, the sojourn time of SUs, equals the total waiting time in the queue
(W (PR; (s); (s); C)) plus the service time (
1
(s)
). It follows that the problem of nding
approximations to the sojourn times of the individual classes is reduced to the problem
of nding approximate values for the waiting time in the queue for the individual class.
According to [118],  is the ratio between waiting time in the M/G/C PR queue and waiting
time in the M/G/C FIFO qeueue, as
 =
W (PR; (k); (k); C)
W (FIFO; (k); (k); C)
(6.10)
In order to approximate the numerator, W (PR; (s); (s); C), the next step is to develop
an approximation for  since the denominator, W (FIFO; (k); (k); C), can be calculated.
When C is not very large and the queue of high priority customer is not very long, 0 =
W (PR; (k); C(k); 1)
W (FIFO; (k); C(k); 1)
is a good approximation for .
Consequently, W (PR; (s); (s); C) can be approximated by.
W (PR; (s); (s); C)  W (PR; (k); C(k); 1) (6.11)
and  =
W (FIFO; (k); (k); C)
W (FIFO; (k); C(k); 1)
.
The rst term, W (PR; (k); C(k); 1), can be derived from the sojourn time in M/G/1
queue, S(PR;m
(p)
; (p); 1), by
W (PR; (k); C(k); 1) = [
1
(s)
2X
j=1
jsk   1
C(s)
] (6.12)
sk is the sojourn time of individual classes (k = p; s) in an M/G/1 preemptive resume priority
system. Let S 0 be a random variable denoting the service time in the one server system. The
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rst and second moment of the average service time are E[S 0] and E[S 02], respectively. sk is
calculated as [119],
sk =
Pk
j=1(
jE[S
02]
2
)
(1  i)(1  i 1) (6.13)
i is the utilization of the server, in an M/G/1 PR system, by jobs of priority 1 to i
i =
iX
j=1
j (6.14)
i is the utilization of the server, in an M/G/1 PR system, by jobs of priority i
i = iE[S
0] (6.15)
The second term, , can be approximated by
  PC((s))
(s)
(6.16)
PC() is the probability of have C or more spectrum users in the queue. It is calculated as
PC() =
p0()(C)
C
C!(1  ) (6.17)
The sojourn time of SUs equals the total waiting time in the queue plus the service time
[120]
Ss =
1
(s)
+W (PR; (s); (s); C)
 1
(s)
+ [
1
(s)
P2
j=1 jsk  
1
C(s)
]
(6.18)
The total waiting time for PUs can be evaluated as though SUs did not exist, which it is not
the focus of this dissertation.
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6.3.2 Time-varying behavior
The basis of most spectrum hole models in the literature is a nite state continuous-time
Markov process which is studied under steady state conditions. In this dissertation, we
consider spectrum users' time varying behaviors. Therefore, the mean arrival rate is i(t)
and the mean service rate is i(t). The waiting time in time-varying model can be solved by
[121]
1. Specify the time interval of interest [t0, tf ] and a time step t. Set the current time t to
t = t0.
2. Approximate the time varying parameters in W () by a constant over t.
3. Apply a standard numerical solution in equation 6.18 and 6.7.
4. Increment time, t = t+t, if t < tf , go to step 2, else stop.
In dynamic spectrum sharing, when the packet length is Li and length of overhead is Loh
for SU, i, the throughput, Ti is calculated by [117]
Ti(t) =
Li + Loh
S(d; 
(k)
; (k); C)(t)
(6.19)
6.4 QUANTIFYING PROFITS
Prots equals revenue minus cost: Profits = Revenue Cost. When SUs' target operation
time is longer than 1 month, two strategies will be applied in calculating prots. First,
spectrum entrants are not risk awareness, so they ignore the changes in demand and value
of management exibility. The prots will be calculated by Net Present Value (NPV) in this
case. The assumption for NPV is that the present value of cash worth more than the future
cash ow. In order to compare the value of project with dierent operation duration, the
cash ow in the future need to be discounted back to its present value as:
NPV =
nX
t=1
Pt
(1 + r)t
(6.20)
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where r is the annual discount rate, Pt is the prots in year t and the lifetime of the project
is n.
The assumption of constant demand and passively undertaking risks are not realistic.
Therefore, in the second strategy, prots will be evaluated based on the anticipation of
changes of demand. Only one type of changes in demand will be tested in this dissertation:
linear decrease with price increase. Moreover, the value of management exibility, mitigation
strategies, that cope with the changes in the demand will be quantied using the real options
method. Prots without and with the value of management exibility will be compared in the
numerical results. The following sections introduce the cost model (section 6.4.1), revenue
model (section 6.4.2), and real options method for evaluating management exibility (section
6.4.3 in detail.
6.4.1 COST MODEL
The cost of providing wireless services varies with each spectrum usage method. For example,
the FCC has rules on maximum transmission power, which limit the coverage of each base
station and then impact the number of base stations that spectrum users need to deploy
in order to meet the coverage requirement. Additionally, spectrum entrants have to pay a
signicant spectrum licensing fee if they choose primary usage, while there is no charge for
spectrum in unlicensed usage. In this dissertation, both capital expenditure (CAPEX) and
operational expenditure (OPEX) that related to spectrum usage will be included. The main
elements in the cost structure mode are [122, 123]:
 Investment in base stations (CB)
 Investments in radio equipment (CR)
 Investments in spectrum (CS)
 Site leases (CL)
 Maintenance and running cost (CM)
The cost of establishing base stations (CB) equals the number of base stations (NB)
that are needed for the target coverage multiplied by the cost of each base stations (Cb), as
described in equation 6.21. The total number of base stations (NB) equals the area of target
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coverage (CVt) divided by the area that can be covered by each base station (CVbs). In this
dissertation, we assume the shape of the cell is circular. Therefore, if the radius of the base
station is Rbh, the area is R
2
bh.
CB = NB  Cb
CVt
R2bh
 Cb
(6.21)
The investment in radio equipment, CR, included the investment in transmitters (CTR)
and sensors (CSE) if applicable. The cost of transmitter (CTR) equals the number of radio
per base station (Nrb) multiplied by the number of base stations (NB) multiplied by the cost
per transmitter (Ctr). Sensor cost (CSE) equals the number of sensors (Nse) multiplied by the
cost per sensor (Cse). The number of sensors equals the target coverage area divided by the
sensor density (DSE). The costs of cognitive capability, data fusion center, and geolocation
capability are evaluated per base station.
CTR = Nrb NB  Ctr (6.22)
CSE =
CV
DSE
 Cse (6.23)
CCC = NB m (6.24)
Where, CC represent cognitive capability, data fusion center, and geolocation capability.
m is the cost of cognitive capability, data fusion center, and gelocation capability per base
station.
The cost for purchasing the right to access the spectrum (CS) varies with spectrum
sharing method. In primary usage, CS is the bid if the spectrum entrant wins the spectrum
auction. In cooperative spectrum sharing through trading, CS is the spectrum leasing fee.
In ASA, CS is the ASA licensing fee. SUs in TVWS, ISM band, and CR based DSA do not
have the cost of purchasing the right to access the spectrum.
The site lease (CSL) is the cost for leasing the space for base stations per year. It is
assumed that spectrum users with high transmission power need to lease a site for base
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Table 6: Cost models for spectrum usage method
CB CS CR CSL CM
Primary Usage Eq 6.21 Spectrum bid Eq 6.22 Yes Yes
Cooperative Eq 6.21 Spectrum leasing fee Eq 6.22 Yes Yes
ASA Eq 6.21 ASA licensing fee Eq 6.22 Yes Yes
TVWS Eq 6.21 { Eq 6.22 6.23 { Yes
ISM Eq 6.21 { Eq 6.22 { Yes
CR based DSA Eq 6.21 { Eq 6.22 6.23 6.24 Depends Yes
stations, while the site lease for low power transmitters can be ignored. Two types of
the transmission power will be investigated for CR base DSA, so the site lease cost for it
depends on the transmission power. The maintenance and running cost include the cost
of maintaining equipment, base stations, and the cost of electricity. The parameters that
applied in this dissertation is summarized in 7.2.2. Table 6 summarizes the cost model for
each spectrum usage method.
6.4.2 REVENUE MODEL
Two types of revenue functions are applied in this dissertation. When the spectrum is
reserved for SUs, such as in the primary usage and quasi-static sharing, the revenue is based
on the number of channels that have been used by the end customers' service demand. That
is, the revenue, Rri , for spectrum entrant i equals the unit revenue, Urc, per channel per unit
of time multiplied by the number of channels during time interval  , NC(), multiplied by
the total number of unit of time. NC() is simulated based on PUs' and SU's trac. The
number of time units equals to the total operation duration (T ) divided by time interval ().
The number of channels that have been used in each time slot is simulated by a M/G/C
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queue model. Appendix C provides the validation of the simulation.
Rri = Urc NC()
T

(6.25)
When spectrum entrant do not have reserved bandwidth, such as in dynamic sharing,
their revenue is based on the throughput that they can support and the quantity of trans-
mitted data. Therefore, the revenue, Roi , for spectrum entrant i equals to the unit revenue,
Urt, per bits multiplied by the quantity of transmitted data size (D
m
i ). The unit revenue is
determined by the lowest throughput throughout the day.
Roi = Urt Dmi (6.26)
6.4.3 QUANTIFYING MITIGATION STRATEGIES
According to equation 3.3, the value of the option equals to the discounted value of the gain
that achieved by the option, H(X;Y; T ) = e rT
R1
Y
(u  Y )	(u;X; Y; T )du. r is the annual
discounted rate and is the same as the r in NPV approach. In the option of switch, expand,
and acquire spectrum, Y is the cost of deploying new spectrum usage method. It is similar
to the cost of each method. X is the revenue that spectrum users can gain by switching,
expanding, and acquiring spectrum. The PDF, 	(u;X; Y; T ) in this case is the changes of
demand. In this dissertation, only linear discrete increase and decrease will be tested. On
the other hand, the options of lease spectrum and infrastructure only happens when demand
decrease and the prots of providing services is less than leasing. In these cases, Y is the
revenue that spectrum users can get from leasing spectrum and infrastructure. X is the
value that spectrum users can gain by providing wireless services.
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7.0 NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This chapter starts from executive summary that concludes the observations for all hypoth-
esis. Then, section 7.2 provides the trac model and all parameters that applied in the
numerical analysis. The following two sections, section 7.3 and section 7.4, analyze the QoS
and prots in detail. The last section, section 7.5 identies risks according to spectrum
entrants' requirement and the best spectrum usage method for distinctive incentives and
limitations.
7.1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This section summaries all observations and results directly related to research hypothesis.
7.1.1 QoS
Hypothesis 1: QoS levels and risks change in diverse situations:
 Dierent spectrum usage models
 Location: urban/rural
 Capacity requirement: time varying/constant
Section 7.3 supports Hypothesis 1 (H1). Expected QoS levels in terms of throughput
are calculated for dierent spectrum sharing methods for both urban and rural areas. In
addition, the best and worst cases of throughput are identied to show the impact of risk
awareness.
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In brief, spectrum entrants' throughput is largely dependent on PUs and competing SUs'
usage. When PUs' usage increase, the expected throughput decreases dramatically. This
brings a signicant risk for SUs in CR based DSA. That is, PUs may transmit meaningless
signals to deter SUs' usage, since PUs cannot benet from CR based DSA. It further pro-
motes cooperative spectrum sharing that is bilaterally negotiated between PUs and SUs. In
this way, PUs have incentives to share their spectrum while SUs can have a higher QoS level.
Additionally, the queueing models that use mean arrival rate to analyze the spectrum access
opportunities cannot capture the real situations for frequency bands that have diurnal be-
haviors. The mean value analysis leads SUs to be over optimistic or over pessimistic about
expected QoS level. Accurate anticipation is extremely important when SUs make their
spectrum usage decision. Moreover, the throughput increase with the augment of number
of operable channels. Noted here, the higher throughput does not necessarily lead to higher
prots, since the cost for expanding the number of operable channels may outnumber the
revenue.
Dynamic sharing is not the only method that has QoS risks. SUs in primary usage and
quasi-static sharing also have QoS risks due to the license/leasing agreement availability.
When the license/leasing agreement is not available, SUs do not have the permission to
operate, the throughput is zero. It is even lower than the expected throughput for dynamic
sharing. Several factors determine the availability of license/leasing agreement: (1) The
availability of the license/leasing agreement from regulators' and PUs' perspective. For
example, if the FCC does not start a spectrum auction, no spectrum license is available. (2)
The competition in obtaining the license/leasing agreement. When the competition is high,
the price of license/leasing agreement increases. It may decrease the probability for certain
SUs to acquire the license/leasing agreement.
The QoS risks depends on the competition of spectrum access, as well as SUs' QoS
requirement. Two types of requirement are applied in the numerical analysis: constant
throughput requirement and time varying throughput requirement. Surveillance camera can
be one application for the constant throughput requirement. In the time varying requirement,
it is assume that spectrum entrants have high throughput requirement from 1 to 8 am, and
low requirement in the rest of the day. Data backup and server upgrade can be candidate for
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this types of requirement. The results show that time varying requirement has lower risk,
since the throughput requirement is opposite to PUs' arrival rate. In general, investigation
of PUs' and competing SUs' behavior are essential. Heterogeneous spectrum usage lead to
lower risks.
7.1.2 PROFITS
Hypothesis 2: Spectrum entrants have dierent expected prots and monetary risks under
diverse situations:
 Dierent spectrum usage methods
 Location: urban/rural
 Operation duration:short/long
 Prot requirement: urban/rural, large/small coverage
Section 7.4 provides results for Hypothesis 2 (H2) in the research questions. Prots are
calculated for each spectrum usage method in both urban and rural area. The gures in
section 7.4 only provide the prots in the 10th year. The detailed prots for each year can
be found in Appendix C. The prots are calculated for best cases (risk unawareness), worst
case (risk awareness), and risk with mitigation strategies. In addition both constant trac
and time varying model are considered.
In summary, the rank of cost in both urban and rural area is: primary usage, cooperative
sharing through trading, CR based DSA, ASA, TVWS, and unlicensed usage in ISM bands.
Spectrum cost in primary usage and cooperative sharing through trading is the factor that
leads to the highest cost. There are two advantage of cooperative sharing through trading
over primary usage. First, SUs in cooperative sharing through trading only pays the license
fee for target coverage and transmission duration, whereas PUs pay the entire geographic
area and operation duration that listed under a license even if they do not provide services in
certain places and times. Second, cooperative sharing through trading requires less upfront
cost which lowers the market entry barrier for SUs. In addition, primary usage and coop-
erative sharing in rural area requires less cost than urban area due to less spectrum cost.
CR based DSA has the third highest cost, due to the expense of sensors, programmable
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transmitters, and the data fusion center. ASA has higher infrastructure based costs than
primary usage and cooperative sharing through trading, since the frequency bands for ASA
are assumed to be at 1700 MHz while primary usage and cooperative sharing through trad-
ing are at 700 MHz. The higher the frequency, the lower the coverage per base station,
and then the more base stations are required to cover the same geographic area. Unlicensed
usage and TVWS have similar costs. SUs in ISM bands do not have expense on geolocation
capability. However, the radius for SUs in the ISM bands is less than TVWS, therefore,
more base stations are required.
When considering revenue and prots, there is no static rank in all cases, since the revenue
and prots change in dierent situations such as locations and risk awareness. Several
observations can be made. First, primary usage and quasi-static sharing provides higher
revenue than dynamic sharing. However, higher revenue may not lead to higher prots.
Primary usage and cooperative sharing through trading lead to negative prots in urban
area due to the high spectrum cost, while several types of dynamic sharing provide positive
prots in both best and worst cases. Second, ASA provides higher revenue than primary
usage and cooperative sharing through trading, since it has larger number of base stations
and then more service demand can be met. When considering the option to improve for
primary usage and cooperative through trading by implementing more base stations, similar
amount of revenue can be generated for these two spectrum usage methods. Third, two
reasons lead to the low revenue of dynamic sharing. The rst one is the pricing scheme. In
dynamic sharing, there is no resource reservation, therefore, the pricing scheme is dierent
from primary usage and quasi-static sharing. The second one is the expected throughput.
For example, unlicensed usage in ISM bands provides positive prots in all cases since the
spectrum can support all the demand in current setting. Whereas, the prots for TVWS
and CR based DSA changes with locations and wireless trac. Fourth, although rural area
has less service demand than urban area, it may lead to higher prots due to less spectrum
cost.
Moreover, two types of mitigation strategies are quantied. The rst one copes with
the situation when demand decreases or the revenue cannot justify the cost. In this case,
spectrum users can lease the infrastructure and spectrum. When the same distribution is
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applied for leasing, the higher the spectrum entrant pays (including both spectrum cost
and infrastructure related costs), the higher the value of mitigation strategies. The second
type of mitigation strategy targets on situations when the current spectrum cannot meet
the demand or extra spectrum can lead to higher prots. In this case, spectrum users have
the option to improve, such as deploy more base stations, expand the number of operable
channels, and switch to other spectrum usage method. In this dissertation, only improve by
the same spectrum usage method is tested. It can be seen that signicant amount of prots
are generate for spectrum users by deploying more base stations. Noted here, it is essential
to consider and quantify the value of mitigation strategy especially when the demand can
hardly been foreseen.
Dierent prot requirements are applied to urban and rural area for large and small
coverage. Here are some highlights: (1) ASA has no risks due to the low cost. (2) PUs and
cooperative sharing have the highest risks in urban area due to the large spectrum cost. It
is because the pricing strategy is based on data service and the wireless trac is assumed to
be data only. It further explains the phenomenon that PUs ooad their trac to unlicensed
band. When considering revenue that generated by voice services, dierent results may be
achieved. (3) There are less risks for PUs and cooperative sharing in rural area due to the
lower prot requirement and spectrum cost. (4) TVWS has negative prots in the worst
case and positive prots in the best case, which demonstrate the importance of considering
competition in spectrum access.
7.1.3 SPECTRUM ENTRANTS' DECISIONS
Hypothesis 3: Spectrum entrants have dierent choices in diverse situations:
 Location: urban/rural
 Operation duration:short/long
 Capacity requirement: time varying/constant
 Prot requirement: urban/rural, large/small coverage
 Risk awareness
 distinct decision criteria: prot maximization; risk minimization; mixed decision criteria.
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Section 7.5 addresses the Hypothesis 3 (H3). In which, Spectrum entrants have dierent
decision criteria (prot maximization, QoS risk minimization, and mixed strategies). More-
over, dierent risk awareness and capacity requirement are applied to both urban and rural
areas.
Based on the current assumption, the rank changes dramatically with decision criteria.
In particular, ASA provides the best results among primary usage and quasi-static sharing
due to the lack of spectrum cost. It followed by trading and primary usage. Trading out-
performs primary usage since the spectrum cost is not an upfront cost and the time factor
decreases the total cost. However, primary usage has less risk than trading as long as the
license is obtained. SUs in trading need to get leasing agreement periodically. In dynamic
sharing, unlicensed usage in the ISM band provides the best results, due to the high expected
throughput. It further explains the popularity of the ISM band. The drawback for CR
based DSA is that the cost is high for sensing, programmable transmitters, and data fusion
centers. The drawback for TVWS is that the throughput maybe low. In CR based DSA
and unlicensed usage in ISM bands, the same trac is applied to PUs and competing SUs,
however the expected throughput change signicantly. It is because PUs have higher priority
in CR based DSA.
Best choices under dierent decision criteria are list as follows: (1) ASA is the best
choice in prot maximization; (2) Unlicensed usage in ISM band is the best choice in QoS risk
minimization. The rank of primary usage, quasi-static sharing, and dynamic sharing depends
on the availability of the license/contract. (3) Unlicensed usage in ISM band outperform in
mixed strategy as well. Following three paragraphs analyze results for each decision criteria.
Observations from table 12 for spectrum entrants that seek prot maximization: (1)
Under the current assumption, cost determines the rank. The higher the cost, the lower the
rank. Therefore, ASA provides the highest prots for all three cases due to the exemption
of spectrum cost. (2) In urban area large coverage, the rank stays the same for all three
decision criteria. In the best case scenario, the rst four strategies (ASA,unlicensed usage
in ISM bands,TVWS,CR based DSA) provide positive prots; in the worst case scenario,
the rst two strategies (ASA,unlicensed usage in ISM bands) provide positive prots; when
considering risks and mitigation, the rst three strategies (ASA,unlicensed usage in ISM
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bands,TVWS) provide positive prots. (3) In urban area small coverage, TVWS is slightly
better than unlicensed usage in the ISM band in the best case scenario and when considering
risks with mitigation strategies, since the total cost for ISM is higher than in the TVWS (the
coverage radius is smaller for unlicensed users in the ISM than ones in the TVWS, which
leads to more base stations and then higher cost). However, TVWS provides negative prots
in the worst case, due to the extremely low throughput. (4) In rural area large coverage, CR
based DSA leads to negative prots in all cases and TVWS leads to negative prots in the
worst case. Among spectrum sharing methods that bring positive prots, the less the cost,
the higher the rank. (5) In rural area small coverage, besides CR based DSA and TVWS,
primary usage leads to negative prots in the worst case and when considering risks with
mitigation. Unlicensed usage in the ISM bands is less protable than cooperative sharing
through trading due to the dierent pricing schemes.
Observations from table 12 for SUs that seek QoS risk minimization: (1) ISM has the
lowest risks in QoS. (2) In urban area, primary and quasi-static sharing has larger risks than
dynamic sharing, since PUs' usage may be high and the competition in getting the license
and leasing agreement is intense. (3) In rural area, PUs' usage decreases and the competition
in getting license and leasing agreement is not intense, therefore, primary and quasi-static
sharing has lower risks than CR based DSA and TVWS.
Observations from table 12 for SUs that apply mixed strategies: (1) In the urban area,
the rst three choices for SUs are: unlicensed usage in the ISM bands, TVWS, and ASA.
Primary usage and cooperative sharing through trading are the least preferred methods due
to the low possibility in getting the license/leasing agreement, and the negative prots. They
will rank higher than TVWS if the license and the leasing agreement are always available.
(2) In rural area, unlicensed usage in the ISM bands are always preferred. It is followed by
primary usage and quasi-static sharing. It is because that these four methods does not have
monetary risks, while TVWS and CR based DSA have. Moreover, TVWS and CR based
DSA also have QoS risks. In other words, in area that the probability of getting a license
is high and the license is not very expensive, transmitting in an exclusive way is preferred.
The reason that unlicensed usage in ISM bands ranks high is because there is no QoS risks
in the current assumption. However, with the intensive usage such as mobile ooading ,
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SUs in the ISM bands has potential QoS risks.
Analysis of factors that aect spectrum entrants' decision: (1) Trac parameters: the
best spectrum usage method is determined for broadband service which is assumed to have
time-varying wireless trac. In the sensitivity analysis, service with constant wireless trac
is determined as well. The QoS risks changes dramatically, however the decision remain the
same under the current setting. (2) QoS requirements: when spectrum entrants' wireless
trac requirement is opposite to PUs' and competing SUs' trac, their QoS risks reduce
dramatically. It further promotes spectrum sharing among heterogeneous applications. (3)
Operation duration: Appendix C provides cost and revenue for the entire ten years. It
is clear that if SUs only want to provide services for less than one year, neither spectrum
sharing method can provide positive prots. In other words, infrastructure based spectrum
sharing method is not preferred for short-time, also called event based, services. For spec-
trum entrants that seeks to provide event based services, Mobile Virtual Network Operators
(MVNOs) may be the best choice. (4) Budget limitation: companies with stringent bud-
get limitation prefer options such as ASA, TVWS and ISM. Primary usage is the one that
requires the highest upfront cost. Cooperative spectrum sharing through trading requires
recurrent spectrum cost.
7.2 TRAFFIC MODELS AND PARAMETERS
7.2.1 TRAFFIC MODELS
As mentioned above, dierent spectrum usage methods pose various levels of risks for spec-
trum entrants. Therefore, two types of trac model are investigated: time invariant trac
and the duty cycle model proposed by [56].
7.2.1.1 Time invariant In the time invariant trac model, the arrival rate is a constant
value A. The time invariant trac for spectrum user, i, si is expressed as,
si (t) = A (7.1)
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7.2.1.2 Duty cycle model In duty cycle model, the arrival rate changes with time. [56]
models the duty cycle of spectrum usage and validate with measurement. Duty cycle, 	(t),
is the utilization in percentage. Therefore, the arrival rate, di , is expressed as utilization
times the maximum arrival rate (Amax),
di (t) = 	(t) Amax (7.2)
	(t) is approximated by following equations, where 	min = min	(t) and 	 is the average
of 	(t).
	(t)  	min + 2T (	 	min)

p

 f
l=m
exp (t; m; )
f
l=m
erf (T; m; )
(7.3)
where 	  	min and:
f l=mexp (t; m; ) =
M 1X
m=0
e
 (
t  m

)2
(7.4)
f
l=m
erf (T; m; ) =
M 1X
m=0
[erf(
m
t
) + erf(
T   m

)] (7.5)
Parameters that applied to model weekday and weekend trac are summarized in table
7, specied in \(minimum; average; maximum)" format. Figure1 shows static trac and
duty cycle model with average parameters. The urban area adopts the weekday trac, and
the rural area adopts the weekends trac, since it is assumed that rural area has less trac
than urban area.
The duty cycle model only provides the percentage of utilization, therefore when calcu-
lating the throughput, the maximum acceptable arrival rate, service rates and capacity needs
to be determined. It is assumed that the system capacity (C) is 11 in all cases. The service
rate is 106 bits per second. Each packet contains 1500 bits, therefore the service rate () is
106=1500 packets per second. The service rate for TV broadcasters is 0.5 per hour. When
PUs are TV broadcasters, the maximum arrival rate is 0.1 per hour. When PUs are other
service providers, the maximum arrival rate is 300 packets per second. In the unlicensed
band, the maximum arrival for competing SUs are 300 packets per second. The maximum
arrival rate for the target spectrum entrant is 1 packet per second. Table 8 summaries all
the parameters that are needed for QoS analysis.
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Table 7: Parameter for duty cycle model
Model Parameter Weekday Weekday
Duty
Cycle
	 0.45 0.2
	min (0.00;0.04;0.31) (0.00;0.05;0.35)
0 (-6.20;-5.01;-3.91) (-4.72;-3.58;-2.46)
1 (10.74;11.65;12.28) (12.04;13.03;14.05)
2 (17.80;18.99;20.09) (19.28;20.42;21.54)
 (3.00;3.88;4.31) (2.49;3.59;5.83)
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Figure 1: Spectrum users' trac models
70
Table 8: Trac Parameters
Parameter Value Units
C 11
 106=1500 packets per second
 for TV broadcasters 0.5 program per hour
self Amax 1 packet per second
Amax for PUs in TVWS 0.1 program per hour
Amax for PUs in CR based DSA 300 packets per second
Amax for other SUs in ISM band 300 packets per second
7.2.2 PARAMETERS
7.2.2.1 PARAMETERS FOR URBAN AND RURAL AREAS Dierent param-
eters are assumed for analyzing urban and rural areas. According to the spectrum auction
results from Auction 73 700 MHz Band Block A (698-704 / 728-734 MHz), the winning bid
for urban is much higher than the one for rural area. In this dissertation, we choose winning
bids for Atlanta GA-AL-NG Economic Area ($103388000) to represent the spectrum price
for urban, and the winning bid for Albany GA Economic Area ($647000) to represent the
spectrum price for rural area.
According to the census statistics, Atlanta, GA 1 has an area of 342:9Km2 and Albany,
GA 2 has a area of 144:7Km2. For the sake of simplicity, it is consider that the large coverage
at urban area is 350Km2 and the large coverage at the rural area is 150Km2. The small
coverage for both cases is 5Km2. Table 9 summarize all parameters that applied in this
dissertation.
1http://www.atlantaga.gov
2http://www.albany.ga.us
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Table 9: Parameters for urban and rural areas
Parameter Urban Rural
Spectrum price $1:03388e8 per year $6:47e5 per year
Coverage 350/5 Km2 150/5 Km2
Demand weekday weekend
7.2.2.2 PARAMETERS FOR COST AND REVENUE ANALYSIS The cover-
age of the base station is a factor that is dicult, if not impossible, to estimate. Meanwhile,
it is important for estimating the cost. Several factors impact the coverage, including target
data rate, path loss, noise, technologies, frequencies, etc. In this dissertation, it is assumed
that the coverage per base station for primary usage and cooperative sharing through trading
is 8.5 Km. The coverage per base station for ASA is 4 Km since the ASA is in the 3.5 GHz
band, which is much higher than 700 MHz. The coverage per base station for TVWS and
CR based DSA is 1 Km, while the coverage per base station for unlicensed usage in the ISM
band is 0.5 Km [124]. The opportunity of implementing micro cell in primary usage and
quasi-static usage will be studied through real options. Moreover, the coverage is calculated
as a circle rather than hexagon for the sake of simplicity.
In primary and quasi-static usage, the service revenue is based on the utilization of the
spectrum. The high unit revenue is $0.09 per minute per channel. This number comes
from the data usage of $20 for 300 MB and assume the data rate is 1 mbps. The low unit
revenue is $0.009 per minute per channel in order to show the dierence. Moreover, when
calculating prots, it is assumed that FCC's spectrum license, spectrum leasing agreements,
and ASA license are always available and the impact from bidding price on these availability
are neglected. The license and leasing agreement availability is considered in he QoS risks.
The revenue in dynamic sharing depends on QoS (throughput level) and the transmitted data
size. Specically, since the spectrum is not reserved for dynamic sharing, the throughput
level may change dramatically. It is assumed that the unit price ($ per bit) that service
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provider can charge is determined by the lowest throughput level in a day. The total revenue
equals the unit price times the total transmitted data size. Table 10 summarize all the cost
parameters that have been applying in this dissertation. Table 11 summarizes the unit price
for dynamic sharing based on 1 Km2 coverage. When coverage shrink to 0.5 Km2, the unit
price reduced to 25% or the listed ones.
7.3 QOS ANALYSIS OF DYNAMIC SHARING MODEL
7.3.1 EXPECTED THROUGHPUT
In primary usage and quasi-static sharing, it is assumed that the spectrum entrants can
achieve their desired QoS level as long as they obtain the license/leasing agreement due to
the resource reservation. However, in the dynamic sharing, there is no resource reservation,
so spectrum entrants may experience dierent levels of QoS. The QoS in this dissertation is
measured by throughput, and modeled by time varying preemptive resume M/G/C queue.
Three factors will be tested:(1) wireless trac shape: constant and time varying; (2)
other spectrum usage: PUs' usage and other competing SUs' usage; and (3) number of
available channels.
Before digging into the detail, there are conclusions from analysis: (1) The assumption of
constant arrival rate cannot depict the real situation when the trac has a diurnal feature;
(2) Spectrum entrants will experience severe service degradation if they cannot accurately
predict PUs and other competing SUs' trac; (3) the larger the number of available channels
are, the higher the throughput. However, in order to operate on wide band, SUs may have
extra cost. This will be analyzed in the real options model; (4) PUs' trac determine the
shape of throughput in TVWS and CR based DSA since they have the highest priority; (5)
when the competition from both PUs and other SUs is low, high throughput can be achieved.
The two letters in the legend throughout this section indicates the wireless trac shape.
The rst letter represents the trac shape for the focused spectrum entrant (C for Constant,
V for time Varying). The second letter represents the trac shape for PUs or competing
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Table 10: Cost and revenue parameters
Name Parameters Unit and Comments
Fixed Sensors 10 per km2
Fixed Sensor Price $300 per sensor
Fixed Sensor Installation Cost $20 per sensor
Cost of Fusion Center $160000 per 226.87Km2
Cost of Cognitive Function in Base Station $1000 per base station
Cost of Establishing a Base Station $6000
Electricity and Maintenance per month $7 high power transmitter
Electricity and Maintenance per month $1 sensor and low power transmitter
Maintenance of Cognitive Base Stations $ 250 per base station per month
Maintenance of Base Station $ 200 per base station per month
Base Station Rental Fees $350 per base station site per month
Cost of Transmitter $6000 high power transmitter
Cost of Transmitter $300 low power transmitter
Transmitter per Base Station 3 high power transmitter
Transmitter per Base Station 1 low power transmitter
Unit Revenue per channel $0.09/ $0.009 per minute per channel
Base station radium in 700 MHz high power 8.5 Km
Base station radium low power 1 Km
Base station radium in 2.5 GHz 0.5 Km
Base station radium in 1750 Hz higher power 4 Km
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Table 11: Unit price for dynamic sharing
Throughput Unit Price
< 50 bps 3:25 10 10 / bit / day / base station
< 100 bps 7 10 10 / bit / day / base station
< 500 bps 1:5 10 9 / bit / day / base station
< 1000 bps 5 10 9 / bit / day / base station
< 2000 bps 10 8 / bit / day / base station
< 5000 bps 5 10 8 / bit / day / base station
< 106 bps 9 10 8 / bit / day / base station
SUs (C for Constant, V for time Varying, and B for Both constant and time varying).
7.3.1.1 TVWS Figure2 provides the throughput for spectrum entrants in TVWS at
urban area. Several observations can be made: (1) the throughput is higher in the dawn
since PUs' usage is low; (2) VV has higher peak throughput, since both spectrum entrants
and PUs ahve low arrival rate in the early morning; (3) it is clear that when PUs' usage is
heavy, the throughput for spectrum entrants is low.
Figure3 shows the throughput for spectrum entrants in the TVWS at rural area. The
peak throughput in rural case is lower than the urban area, it is due to the trac shape.
According to the duty cycle model, the minimum arrival rate for rural area is higher than
urban area, although the peak and average arrival rate for rural area is much lower than
urban area. In rural area, when spectrum entrants' trac shape changes from time-varying to
constant, the throughput level does not change signicantly since PUs' usage is the dominant
factor.
7.3.1.2 CR based DSA Figure4 provides the throughput for spectrum entrants in CR
based DSA at urban area. Similar observations as the case for TVWS can be made. PUs'
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Figure 2: Throughput for TVWS in urban area
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Figure 3: Throughput for TVWS in rural area
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usage dominates the shape of throughput. When PUs' trac increases from V to B, the
throughput decreases dramatically.
Figure5 provides the throughput for spectrum entrants in CR based DSA in rural area.
Compare to Figure4, the minimum throughput in rural area is much higher, since the max-
imum utility in duty cycle for rural area is less the one in urban area.
7.3.1.3 UNLICENSED USAGE IN ISM BANDS In this section, the throughput
for spectrum entrants in the ISM bands are provided. Figure6 and Figure7 depict throughput
for urban and rural area. According to the gure, the throughput is almost 106bps throughout
the day. It is because the service rate is larger than arrival rate. The throughput mainly
depends on service time, which is the transmission time of packets.
The comparison of Figure6 and Figure7 with Figure4 and Figure5 shows that the through-
put for target spectrum entrant in the ISM bands is much higher than the one in CR based
DSA, although PUs in the CR based DSA and competing SUs in the ISM bands have the
same trac intensity and shape. It is because that spectrum entrants have lower priority
in CR based DSA and their services can be preempted by PUs, while all spectrum entrants
have the same priority in the ISM bands and served as FIFO.
7.3.1.4 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS Sensitivity analysis is important to show how
the output can be aected by uncertainties. In this section, three sensitivity analysis will be
conducted. The results will be compared with throughput for CR based DSA. The factors
that will be tested include: capacity, competition among spectrum entrants, and PUs' arrival
rate.
The rst sensitive analysis focuses on capacity. In Figure8, the system capacity increases
from 11 to 22 in the CR based DSA, the throughput increases dramatically. For example,
the peak throughput increases from 44418.43 bps to 85099.71 bps. Noted here, the increase
of throughput does not necessarily lead to increment of prots. The prots depends on cost
of increasing capacity, demand, and pricing schemes.
The second sensitivity analysis focuses on the competition among spectrum entrants in
CR based DSA. In this case, the arrival rate for spectrum entrants doubled, however the
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Figure 4: Throughput for CR based DSA in urban area
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Figure 5: Throughput for CR based DSA in rural area
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Figure 6: Throughput for ISM in urban area
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Figure 7: Throughput for ISM in rural area
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Figure 8: Throughput for CR based DSA in urban with time varying arrival with high
number available channels
throughput does not decrease dramatically. The peak throughput decrease from 44418.43
bps to 44137.42 bps. Several reasons lead to this conclusion: (1) this dissertation assumes
that all spectrum entrants can coordinate with each other; (2) all spectrum entrants have
the same priority, therefore they are served as FIFO. If spectrum entrants cannot coordinate
with each other, they may experience extra interference and then service degradation.
The third sensitivity analysis focuses on PUs' arrival rate. In this analysis, the PUs'
maximum arrival rate decrease from 300 packets per second to 150 packets per second. The
peak throughput increases from 44418.43 bps to 155975 bps. It further shows that PUs'
usage dominates the throughput.
7.3.2 QoS RISKs
QoS risks come from dierent factors in dierent spectrum sharing methods. In primary
usage, spectrum license availability and the competition in the FCC spectrum auction deter-
mine the risks in QoS. In quasi-static sharing, spectrum leasing agreement and ASA license
availability determines the risks in QoS. Moreover, the competition among spectrum entrants
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Figure 9: Throughput for CR based DSA in urban with time varying arrival with high
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Figure 10: Throughput for CR based DSA in urban with time varying arrival with low PUs
arrival
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such as bidding in spectrum trading complicates the QoS risks. In dynamic sharing, the QoS
risks result from PU and competing SUs' wireless trac.
In this section, it is assumed that the minimum throughput requirement for dynamic
sharing is 1 Kbps, and the risks are calculated by equation 6.1. Further, it is assume that
the risks in getting spectrum license, spectrum leasing agreement, and ASA license in urban
area is 0.9. In other words, the probability of getting the transmission permission is 0.1.
The risks in getting spectrum license, spectrum leasing agreement, and ASA license in rural
area is 0.1. Therefore, the probability of getting the transmission permission is 0.9. The
parameters that set for urban and rural area aim at showing dierent levels of competition
and license/spectrum availability in dierent region.
Figure 11: QoS risks with constant throughput requirement
From Figure11, it is clear unlicensed usage show the greatest potential when considering
QoS in both urban and rural area. In urban area, dynamic sharing has lower risks than
primary usage and quasi-static sharing. It also explains the popularity of the dynamic sharing
in high population density region. In rural area, when the QoS risks in primary usage and
quasi-static sharing decrease (the availability of spectrum license, leasing agreement, and
ASA license increase), TVWS and CR based DSA are not attractive any more.
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Figure 12: QoS risks with time varying throughput requirement
In Figure12, a dierent capacity requirement is applied. Instead of constant capacity
requirement, the capacity requirement changes with time in this case. Specically, the
capacity requirement between 1-8 am is 1 kbps and 100 bps in the rest of the time. Only
the results for CR based DSA and TVWS are shown here. Comparison of Figure12 and 11
shows that when spectrum entrants' QoS requirement can be adjust to the spectrum usage
environment, the risks decreases.
7.4 MONETARY ANALYSIS OF EACH SPECTRUM USAGE MODEL
In this section, prots in dierent situations will be showed and factors that impact prots
will be identied. The detailed cost, revenue, and prots are summarized in Appendix C.
This section only shows representative gures. The prots shown in this section is the prot
that spectrum entrants can get at the 10th year. Three types of prots are shown, best, worst,
and risk. Best case in primary usage and quasi-static sharing is the prots that determined
by high unit price. Best case in dynamic sharing is the case when maximum throughput
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is applied. On the contrary, the worst case in primary usage and quasi-static sharing is
the prots that determined by low unit price. Worst case in dynamic sharing is the case
considering PUs' and competing SUs' time-varying and constant behaviors. Prots under
risk assume the probability of obtaining the revenue linearly decreases with the increase of
the revenue.
Some conclusions can be made : (1) Spectrum cost is the dominant factor for the prots
that spectrum entrants can get in primary usage and quasi-static sharing. (2) Low demand
in rural area may not necessarily lead to low prots, due to the low spectrum cost. (3) when
the spectrum cost and demand is uniformly distributed across the entire area, the larger the
coverage, the higher the prots. However, if the spectrum cost and demand is not uniformly
distributed, it may not be true. (4) When low unit price attracts the same amount of demand
as large unit price does, low unit price brings lower prots. However, if the low unit price
attracts higher demand, this conclusion may not stay the same. (5) Spectrum entrants that
cannot precisely predict service demand may lead to either cannot meat the soaring demand
or over investigate in infrastructure. However, they have mitigation strategies that will be
analyzed in the real options model to remedy these situations. (6) Prots that gain under
risk is between best and worst case.
7.4.1 EXPECTED PROFITS
7.4.1.1 PRIMARY USAGE Figure13 shows prots for primary usage in dierent sce-
narios. X-ticks represent combinations of area (U for urban, R for Rural)and coverage (L
for Large, S for Small). Three bars in each case is the prot when high unit price, low unit
price, and risks are applied.
Some observation can be made from Figure13: (1) All cases except rural area large
coverage leads to negative prots. Noted here, although the wireless trac in urban area
is larger than in rural area, the total number of resource blocks that have been used is
the same for urban area and rural area, due to the limitations of the infrastructure. SUs
have the option to implement more infrastructures in order to meet all service demand
and increase prots with higher expenses on infrastructure. This will be quantied in next
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section. (2) Small coverage is less protable than large coverage, since SUs pay the same
amount of spectrum cost even if they target on small coverage and it is assumed that the
service demand is uniformly distributed across the entire region. In other words, the revenue
in small coverage is much less than the one in large coverage. (3) Low unit price is less
protable than high unit price. It is because we assume that the demand is the same in low
unit price and high unit price. In reality, the demand may change with the unit price. For
example, the demand is higher when the unit price is low. If it is the case, the revenue for
low unit price will increase.
Figure 13: Prots of primary usage
7.4.1.2 COOPERATIVE THROUGH TRADING It is assumed that the average
spectrum leasing price is uniformly distributed according time and geographic locations. In
other words, the average unit spectrum leasing price equals total spectrum cost divided by
license duration, which is 10 years in this case, and divided by the geographic coverage
(350 Km2 for urban area and 150 Km2 for rural area). X-ticks in the gures represent
combinations of area (U for urban, R for Rural), Coverage (L for Large, S for Small), and
spectrum leasing charge (A for average).
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Figure 14: Prots of cooperative sharing through trading
Compare Figure13 with Figure14, it is clear that (1) When the average leasing price is
applied, the prots in cooperative through trading is slightly higher than the ones in the
primary usage, due to the time discount aect. Therefore, even if spectrum entrants will
pay the full price of the spectrum, the time eect in trading provides benet. However, this
benet is not come without cost. The risk associate with the discounted charge of spectrum
is the spectrum leasing agreement availability. There is no guarantee that spectrum entrants
can always nd operable spectrum leasing agreement. (2) Cooperative sharing through
trading provides higher prots in small coverage than primary usage. The reason for this
phenomenon is that the spectrum charge that paid by spectrum entrants in this case only
cover their demand area, instead of paying the spectrum cost for the entire licensed coverage.
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7.4.1.3 ASA In the ASA usage model, there is no spectrum cost. Therefore, the cost of
small coverage in urban is the same as the cost of small coverage in rural area. Moreover, it
is assumed that the coverage for single base station shrank in ASA because the frequency is
higher. Thus, the infrastructure cost in ASA is higher than the one in primary usage and
cooperative sharing through trading. X-ticks in the gures represent combinations of area
(U for urban, R for Rural) and Coverage (L for Large, S for Small).
Figure 15: Prots of ASA
Compare Figure15 with Figure13 and Figure14, it can be seen that prots for large
coverage in urban area is positive under ASA while it is negative in both primary usage and
cooperative sharing through trading. It is because under ASA, there is no license fee. It
also proves that license fee is the dominate factor in determining prots for primary usage
and quasi-static sharing. It further indicates that spectrum sharing between federal and
commercial usage can benet spectrum entrants, especially when spectrum entrants can
operate over large coverage with low spectrum cost.
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7.4.1.4 TVWS Figure16 shows prots for TVWS in both urban and rural area. Some
observations can be made: (1) The expected prots in the best case for the same coverage
in both constant and time varying case are the same, since it is assumed that throughput
requirement can be met. Therefore, as long as the demand is the same, the prots is the
same. The worst case does not necessarily lead to the same prots. Although they are the
same in this case, when the pricing method and spectrum utilization change, it may not stay
the same. (2) It can be seen that the prots in the best case scenarios are positive and all
prots in worst case are negative. That means when worst case occurs, spectrum entrants
will lose money. It further shows the importance of considering the risks. (3) The dominant
cost factor for spectrum entrants in TVWS is the cost for transmitters and geolocation
capabilities, which depends on the coverage. Therefore, the larger the coverage, the higher
the cost. (4) Low prots in rural area is due to the less demand.
7.4.1.5 CR based DSA Figure17 shows prots for CR based DSA in both urban and
rural areas. Compare the cases in TVWS, it is clear that CR based DSA is less protable
than TVWS, although the throughput in CR based DSA may not be lower than the one
in TVWS. It is because the cost of establishing CR based DSA is much higher than the
costs for building infrastructure in TVWS. Comparing dierent groups in Figure17, it can
be seen that cases in rural area is less protable than the one in urban area. Moreover, large
coverage is more protable than small coverage. It is because urban area has larger service
demand. Furthermore, due to the assumption of uniform distribution of service demand,
large coverage has higher service demand than small coverage.
7.4.1.6 UNLICENSED USAGE Figure18 shows prots for unlicensed usage in both
urban and rural area. Some observations can be made: (1) Under the current setting, the
11 channels can meet the service demand in all occasions. It is because the service rate is
higher than the arrival rate. Moreover, it is assumed that spectrum entrants can coordinate
with each other. If it is not the case, spectrum entrants may experience higher interference
and then decrease the throughput. (2) Compare with CR based DSA, the competing SUs
have the same arrival rate and trac shape as PUs in the CR based DSA. However, in
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(a) Prots of TVWS in urban area
(b) Prots of TVWS in rural area
Figure 16: Prots of TVWS
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(a) Prots of CR based DSA in urban area
(b) Prots of CR based DSA in rural area
Figure 17: Prots of CR based DSA
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unlicensed bands, all users have the same priority, therefore the throughput for focused
spectrum entrant is much higher than in the previous case. Both best and worst case in
urban area leads to positive prots. Both constant and time varying in urban area leads to
positive prots. (3) Urban small coverage has signicant less prots than large area due to
the assumption of uniform distribution of demand. In reality, spectrum entrants with small
area may have higher prots than large coverage since the demand in small area is intense
and the demand in large coverage is not far more than in the small area, and the cost for
covering larger area increase dramatically. It is also the case for rural area. All situations in
the rural area lead to negative prots due to the low demand.
7.4.1.7 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS The rst sensitivity analysis focuses on spectrum
leasing price. Spectrum leasing price does not stay the same for all occasions. For example,
spectrum leasing price may increase when PUs' demand increase or the competition in getting
spectrum leasing agreement is intense. The opposite situations may decrease the spectrum
leasing price. In this dissertation, these two situations are tested by high and low unit price.
The high unit spectrum leasing price is 1.5 times of the average unit leasing charges, and
the low unit spectrum leasing price is 0.67 times of the average unit leasing charge.
Figure19 shows the situation when high leasing price is applied. The result for low leasing
price can be found in Appendix C. It can be seen that high spectrum leasing charge leads to
low prots than low spectrum leasing charge does. It is because the the demand and service
charge are assumed to be the same. It is possible that spectrum entrants that are willing to
pay high spectrum leasing charge have higher demand or service charge. In this way, their
prots may be even higher than the spectrum entrants that get low spectrum leasing price.
The second sensitivity analysis focuses on ASA license availability. In Figure20 the ASA
license availability decreases from 1 to 0.1. Comparison of Figure20 with Figure15 shows
that the expected prots is much higher when the ASA license is always available than the
ASA license is only available for 10% of the time.
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(a) Prots of ISM in urban area
(b) Prots of ISM in rural area
Figure 18: Prots of ISM
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Figure 19: Prots of cooperative sharing through trading with dierent spectrum cost
Figure 20: Prots of ASA with low ASA license availability
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7.4.2 MONETARY RISKS
This section evaluates the monetary risks. Equation 6.4 is applied. The required prots,
PRi, varies with location and coverage. PRi = 1000000 for urban area large coverage,
PRi = 100000 for urban area small coverage and rural area large coverage, PRi = 10000 for
rural area small coverage.
In Figure21 and 22, risks equals to 1 means the spectrum sharing method leads to
negative prots, and risks equals to 0 means the expected prot is higher than the required
one. From Figure21, it can be seen that (1) ASA does not have monetary risks in neither
case. (2) Primary usage and cooperative sharing through trading lead to negative prots.
(3) TVWS leads to negative prots in the worst case, while the best case brings positive
prots. (4) CR based DSA is more risky than TVWS in the best cases, since the cost for
CR based DSA is much higher than TVWS. (5) Unlicensed usage in the ISM bands does
not have risks in the large coverage, but the risk is 0.70 in small coverage due to less service
demand and dierent prots requirements.
The monetary risk changes signicantly when the location switches from urban to rural.
As depicted in Figure22, in rural area, (1) Primary usage and cooperative sharing through
trading provides positive prots except primary usage in the worst case. It is because the
spectrum cost in rural area is extremely less than the spectrum cost for urban area. (2) CR
based DSA leads to negative prots in both large and small coverage due to less demand and
high cost. (3) TVWS leads to negative prots in the worst case due to the low throughput
and demand.
7.4.3 VALUE OF MITIGATION STRATEGIES
In this section, the value of mitigation strategies are quantied for lease (spectrum and
infrastructure) and improve by the same sharing method.
7.4.3.1 OPTION OF LEASING The scenario for lease spectrum and infrastructure
usually happens when service demand decrease and then prots decrease. From the results
that shown below, it is clear that even if demand decrease that spectrum entrants' revenue
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(a) Monetary risks for urban area large coverage
(b) Monetary risks for urban area small coverage
Figure 21: Monetary risks for urban area
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(a) Monetary risks for rural area large coverage
(b) Monetary risks for rural area small coverage
Figure 22: Monetary risks for rural area
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that gain from providing wireless services is not in line with cost, it is not necessary that
spectrum entrants will have negative prots. Lease spectrum and infrastructure may lead to
a positive prots or reduce the loss. In this dissertation, it is assumed that only PUs have the
opportunity to lease the spectrum. Spectrum entrants in cooperative through trading does
not have the authority to sublease their spectrum. All spectrum users have the opportunity
to lease their infrastructure. It is further assumed that the demand for leasing spectrum and
infrastructure is a linearly decrease function with increased price, as described in equation
7.6:
f =  2=m2  x+ 2=m; (7.6)
where m is the maximum price that can be charged for lease spectrum and infrastructure.
For spectrum leasing, m equals the spectrum cost per year (spectrum cost divided by ten).
For infrastructure leasing, m equals the cost for establishing base stations, all equipment,
and maintenance per year. When the competition in getting spectrum and infrastructure is
high, maximum price may go beyond these points.
In Figure23b, only infrastructure lease for urban area large coverage (Urban Large),
rural area large coverage (Rural Large), and small coverage (Small) are shown. It is because
that the infrastructure leasing only depends on the cost of infrastructure. And the cost
of infrastructure only depends on the coverage and base station radius in this model. In
other words, the small coverage in rural and urban area have the same infrastructure cost,
therefore, the leasing revenue is the same for both cases. Figure23a demonstrates this point.
It is clear that spectrum leasing brings the largest leasing revenue, since the spectrum cost
is much higher than the infrastructure cost in all cases. When compare the infrastructure
leasing revenue, it can be seen that CR based DSA has the highest gain. It is because the
infrastructure cost in CR based DSA is the highest one due to the large cost in sensors and
fusion center. TVWS have higher cost than unlicensed usage due to the cost on geolocation
capability. ASA has high infrastructure cost and then higher infrastructure leasing revenue
than cooperative sharing through trading. It is because of the assumption that ASA operates
on higher frequency bands. Thus, the coverage per base station is smaller and then more
base stations are needed to cover the same area.
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(a) Revenue for PUs to lease spectrum and infras-
tructure
(b) Revenue for lease infrastructure
Figure 23: Value of lease spectrum and infrastructure
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7.4.3.2 OPTION OF IMPROVING In the current setting, only ASA and unlicensed
usage meet all service requirements. Therefore, improving the current infrastructure and
then meet all service demand is the goal for spectrum entrants. Users in primary usage and
cooperative sharing through trading can increase the number of base stations to meet service
demand in urban and rural area large coverage. Spectrum entrants in TVWS does not have
the capability to improve, since the only frequency bands they can use is the TVWS and the
availability solely depends on PUs' usage. CR based DSA can improve the throughput by
transmitting on a broader frequency bands with more sophisticated transmitters and sensors.
Whether the higher number of operable frequency bands can lead to higher prots depends
on the extra cost and revenue. In this section, equation 7.6 is applied to quantify the value of
option to improving for primary usage, cooperative sharing through trading, and CR based
DSA.
Figure 24: Value of options to improve
Figure24 shows the value of improve. Spectrum entrants in primary usage and cooper-
ative sharing through trading generate positive revenue by establishing more base stations,
since they can meet more service demand. However, spectrum entrants in CR based DSA
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cannot benet from improving. The revenue that brought by extending operable channels
from 11 to 22 cannot justify the cost. This situation may be changed when the cost of
infrastructures decrease to a certain level, where SUs can have a desired throughput.
In short, spectrum entrants in dynamic sharing do not have much room to improve by
their own spectrum sharing method, since the QoS level is determined by PUs and other
SUs in the same band. However, spectrum entrants in dynamic sharing can improve by
acquiring more spectrum through other spectrum sharing methods. For example, they can
lease spectrum from PUs and become a ASA licensee while keep transmitting dynamically.
Similar conclusion applies to quasi-static sharing. Spectrum entrants in cooperative sharing
through trading and ASA face limitations when leasing agreement and ASA license are not
available. Moreover, competition in getting the leasing agreement and ASA license is intense
in protable areas. When the leasing agreement and ASA license are not available or the
frequency bands listed under leasing agreement and ASA license are not enough to support
their service demands, spectrum entrants can investigate in TVWS in order to to acquire
more spectrum and meet service demand. In summary, for a spectrum entrant that plans
to provide continuous wireless service by sharing spectrum, it needs at least one spectrum
sharing method from each (quasi-static and dynamic sharing) category.
7.4.3.3 PROFITS WITH RISKS AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES In sec-
tion 7.4.1, prots are determined based on constant demand for both best and worst case
scenarios. However, best and worst cases are not the only disciplines to evaluate the expected
prots. When considering the dynamic in the market, service demand can be a decreasing
function of the increased of price. In this dissertation, when risks in prots are considered,
it is assumed that the probability of gaining a certain amount of revenue decreases with the
increase of the amount of the revenue.
Besides the risks, as aforementioned in section 7.4.3, spectrum entrants have the oppor-
tunity to mitigate risks. In the current setting, only spectrum entrants in primary usage and
cooperative sharing through trading have the possibility to increase the prot by deploying
more base stations. Spectrum entrants in TVWS and CR based DSA cannot improve by
their own method, however, they can switch to cooperative sharing through trading, pri-
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mary usage, ASA, and unlicensed usage. The value of the right to switching is not explicitly
quantied in the option, since the full analysis of each method is shown in 7.4.
Figure25 26 27 and 28 shows the prots that each method leads to when considering
risks and mitigation strategies. In summary, ASA still provide the highest prots in all
cases. When considering risks and mitigation strategies, primary usage and cooperative
sharing through trading has higher prots than even the best case scenario.
7.5 CASE STUDIES
7.5.1 BROADBAND SERVICES
In this section, the target spectrum entrant aims at providing broadband services. Table 12
provides the rank for dierent combinations of location, coverage, and decision criteria. P
represents primary usage, CT represents cooperative sharing through trading, A represents
ASA, T represents TVWS, C represents CR based DSA, and I represents unlicensed usage
in the ISM bands. Under Criteria column, B indicates prots in the best case scenario,
W indicates prots in the worst case scenario, and R indicates prots considering risks and
mitigation strategies. The numerical value is the weight for protsWp that dened in section
6.1. Following four sections will illustrate the situation in each combination of location and
coverage in detail.
7.5.1.1 URBAN AREA LARGE COVERAGE When the spectrum entrant aims
at providing services in urban area for a large coverage, it is assumed that service provider
will provide services to the entire geographic region that lists under the license. Other than
directly purchasing licenses from the FCC, spectrum entrants can purchase spectrum leasing
agreement from PUs and get ASA license that cover the entire region, or they can choose
dynamic sharing to provide the services. If the spectrum entrant chooses to be a dynamic
spectrum sharing user, it is assumed that it can perfectly sense PUs' usage and coordinate
with other SUs. Perfect sensing does not necessarily requires spectrum entrant's transmitters
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(a) Prots for primary usage and quasi-static
sharing in urban area large coverage considering
risks and mitigation strategies
(b) Prots for dynamic sharing in urban area large
coverage considering risks and mitigation strate-
gies
Figure 25: Prots for urban area large coverage considering risks and mitigation strategies
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(a) Prots for primary usage and quasi-static
sharing in urban area small coverage considering
risks and mitigation strategies
(b) Prots for dynamic sharing in urban area
small coverage considering risks and mitigation
strategies
Figure 26: Prots for urban area small coverage considering risks and mitigation strategies
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(a) Prots for primary usage and quasi-static
sharing in rural area large coverage considering
risks and mitigation strategies
(b) Prots for dynamic sharing in rural area large
coverage considering risks and mitigation strate-
gies
Figure 27: Prots for rural area large coverage considering risks and mitigation strategies
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(a) Prots for primary usage and quasi-static
sharing in rural area small coverage considering
risks and mitigation strategies
(b) Prots for dynamic sharing in rural area small
coverage considering risks and mitigation strate-
gies
Figure 28: Prots for rural area small coverage considering risks and mitigation strategies
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to be co-located with PUs' transmitters. Frequently checking the database for TVWS and
locate sensors close to PUs' transmitters are other means to reduce interference with PUs.
In TVWS and unlicensed usage in ISM bands, the transmission power cap limit the reach
of each base station. It is possible that the end-to-end communication exceed the coverage
of one base station, then a relay of the data by base stations will be scheduled.
In summary, observations from table 12 show that: (1) If the spectrum entrant seeks
prot maximization, ASA is the best choice. The rank stays the same for all three decision
criteria (best case, worst case, and risk with mitigation strategies). In the best case scenario,
the rst four strategies (A,I,T,C) provide positive prots; in the worst case scenario, the
rst two strategies (A,I) provide positive prots; when considering risks and mitigation
strategies, the rst three strategies (A,I,T) provide positive prots. Moreover, in the current
assumption, cost determines the rank. The higher the cost, the lower the rank. (2) If the
spectrum entrant seeks QoS risk minimization, unlicensed usage in the ISM bands is the
best choice. Primary and quasi-static sharing have higher risks than dynamic sharing, since
the competition in getting the license and leasing agreement in urban area is intense. (3) If
the spectrum entrant considers mixed strategies with dierent weight, the rst three choices
for spectrum entrants are: unlicensed usage in the ISM bands, TVWS, and ASA. Primary
usage and cooperative sharing through trading are the least preferred methods due to the
low possibility in getting the license and leasing agreement and the negative prots. They
will rank higher than TVWS if the license and the leasing agreement are always available.
7.5.1.2 URBAN AREA SMALL COVERAGE In this case, the target spectrum
entrant plans to provide wireless service in urban area with a small coverage (5 Km2). The
majority of the application only need one hop (from access point or base station to user
device). However, when end-to-end communications occur at the edge of the coverage, base
stations may need to relay the data.
When the spectrum entrant only wants to provide services to small area, their infras-
tructure cost reduces dramatically. However, it is assumed that primary usage still requires
the same amount of spectrum licensing fee as large coverage, since the spectrum license is
issued based on large geographic area. Compared to primary usage, spectrum entrants in
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cooperative sharing through trading only pays spectrum cost for the target coverage and
operation duration. It is assumed that PUs will divide the licensing fee linearly according to
coverage and time. Therefore, the spectrum cost for small coverage in cooperative sharing
through trading is much less than primary usage. In addition, it is assumed that the demand
is proportion of the coverage. That means the less the coverage, the less the demand. There-
fore, the revenue for small coverage is less than the revenue for large coverage. However,
it may not be the case in the reality where small coverage has the highest population den-
sity. Moreover, with smaller coverage, the availability of spectrum leasing agreement, ASA
license, and spectrum holes may changes, which is outside the scope of this dissertation.
In summary, observations from table 12 shows that: (1) If the spectrum entrant is
prot maximizing, ASA is the best choice for all three cases. TVWS is slightly better than
unlicensed usage in the ISM band in the best case scenario and when considering risks and
mitigation strategies, since the total cost for unlicensed usage is higher than TVWS. However,
TVWS provides negative prots in the worst case, due to the extremely low throughput. (2)
ASA is preferred when the target spectrum entrant emphasizes on prots and unlicensed
usage is preferred when QoS risks is the focus.
7.5.1.3 RURAL AREA LARGE COVERAGE There are several distinctions be-
tween large coverage in urban and rural area: (1) the spectrum license cost is less in rural
area than in urban one; (2) according to the chosen spectrum auction, the geographic cover-
age in rural (150 Km2) is smaller than urban (350 Km2); (3) it is assumed that the demand
in rural area is less than in urban, due to the less population density; (4) the availability of
spectrum license, ASA license, spectrum leasing agreement, and spectrum hole is higher in
rural than in urban due to the less competition.
In summary, observations from table 12 shows that: (1) If the spectrum entrant seeks
prot maximization, ASA is the best choice followed by cooperative sharing through trading,
primary usage, and then dynamic sharing. CR based DSA leads to negative prots in all cases
and TVWS leads to negative prots in the worst case. Among spectrum sharing methods
that bring positive prots, the less the cost, the higher the rank. (2) If the spectrum entrant
aims at minimize QoS risks, unlicensed usage in the ISM bands is the best choice followed
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by primary usage quasi-static sharing and then other two methods in dynamic sharing.
It is because the QoS risks in primary usage and quasi-static sharing is low in rural area
due to less competition in getting license/leasing agreement. As long as spectrum entrants
have the transmission permission in primary usage and quasi-static sharing, they have the
reservation of the spectrum which lead to higher throughput than CR based DSA and TVWS.
(3) If mixed strategy with dierent weight is applied, unlicensed usage in the ISM bands
is preferred. It is followed by primary usage and quasi-static sharing. It is because that
these four methods does not have monetary risks, while TVWS and CR based DSA have.
Moreover, TVWS and CR based DSA also have QoS risks. In other words, in area that the
probability of getting a license is high and the license is not very expensive, transmitting in
an exclusive way is preferred. The reason that unlicensed usage in ISM bands ranks high is
because there is no QoS risks in the current assumption. Noted here, contrast to exclusive
usage, spectrum entrants in the ISM bands has potential QoS risks when more spectrum
users transmit in the same bands.
7.5.1.4 RURAL AREA SMALL COVERAGE Similar as urban area small cover-
age, the spectrum cost for small coverage in rural is the same as large coverage under primary
usage, and divided according to coverage and operation duration under cooperative sharing
through trading.
In summary, observations from table 12 shows that: (1) If the spectrum entrant seeks
prot maximization, ASA is the best choice. The following rank changes with spectrum
entrants' risk attitude. If they consider the best case scenario, cooperative sharing through
trading and primary usage are the second and third preferred methods. If the spectrum
entrant considers worst case scenario or risk with mitigation strategies, unlicensed usage in
ISM bands moves up to the third position while primary usage lead to negative prots. (2)
If the spectrum entrant seeks QoS risk minimization, unlicensed usage in ISM bands is the
best choice followed by primary usage, quasi-static sharing, and then dynamic sharing. (3)
If mixed strategy with dierent weight is applied, unlicensed usage in the ISM bands is still
preferred followed by primary usage, quasi-static sharing, and then dynamic sharing. The
rank inside dynamic sharing changes with spectrum entrant's attitude. When the best case
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scenario is considered, TVWS outperformed CR based DSA. When the worst case scenario is
considered, CR based DSA outperformed TVWS. It is because spectrum entrants in TVWS
have low throughput in worst case, which leads to negative prots.
7.5.2 CONSTANT TRAFFIC
Above decisions are made based on the assumption that the spectrum entrant targets on
providing broadband services, which lead to time-varying trac. When spectrum entrant
changes from providing broadband services to services that generate constant wireless trac,
decisions may change. According to the current setting, the prots for time-varying trac
and constant trac stay the same. However, the QoS risks change as depict in Figure29.
Figure 29: QoS risks
Based on the new QoS risks, the decision for spectrum entrant changes. Only one example
is provided here for comparison. In the urban area large coverage scenario, when Wq = 0:5,
the rank of spectrum usage methods for users have constant trac is: I > A > T > C >
P = CT (best case), I > A > C > T > P = CT (worst case). Due to the increase in the
QoS risks of TVWS, the rank of TVWS in decision decreases.
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7.5.3 EVENT BASED SERVICES
Operation duration also impacts on QoS and monetary risks. With shorter period of oper-
ation time, spectrum entrants may be able to anticipate the spectrum usage environment
more accurately. In addition, the event based services usually do not have demand risk.
The reason they provide services is due to the large demand, such as wireless services for a
conference and sports game. However, large amount of demand does not necessarily lead to
high prots due to the large upfront cost for both spectrum and infrastructure.
Appendix C provides cost and revenue for the entire ten years. According to current
setting, if spectrum entrants only want to provide services for less than one year, non of the
spectrum sharing method can provide positive prots. In other words, infrastructure based
spectrum sharing method is not preferred for short-time services. For spectrum entrant that
seek to provide event based services, MVNOs may be the best choice.
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8.0 CONCLUSION
The rapid proliferation of various forms of mobile devices, coupled with the expansion of
wireless Internet services, brought to the limitations of the static command and control
approach of spectrum management. Spectrum sharing emerged as a promising method
by providing the exibility needed to respond to temporal and spatial variations of trac
statistics and bandwidth requirements of dierent services. Therefore, when a potential
wireless service provider (spectrum entrant) comes to the market, it has to choose from more
than one spectrum usage methods, including primary usage, quasi-static sharing (cooperative
sharing through trading and ASA), and dynamic sharing (TVWS, CR based DSA, and
unlicensed usage in the ISM band).
Despite of the merits in spectrum sharing, such as providing exibility, certain level of
QoS guarantees, and increasing spectrum utilization eciency, it has been adopted slowly
due to the embedded risks. Thus, the motivation of this research is to transform spectrum
sharing from a radical strategy to commercial reality by understanding and minimizing spec-
trum sharing risks. Two types of risks are modeled in this dissertation: (1) QoS risks: come
from competition in spectrum access. For example, mobile ooading and heterogeneous
applications may increase the spectrum access demand and reduce spectrum access oppor-
tunities; (2) monetary risks: spectrum users' revenue may not be in line with cost due to
changes in the spectrum usage environment, QoS levels, and demands.
Specically, QoS risks are quantied with respect to throughput by a queueing model.
In order to provide a realistic spectrum usage environment, a time-varying preemptive re-
sume M/G/C queue was built to model spectrum users with subordinate rights and diurnal
behavior. Throughput was calculated based on dierent trac models, expected number of
spectrum users, and number of accessible channels to reect sharing in dierent temporal
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and spatial domains. Monetary risks in terms of prots consider costs, revenue, and mitiga-
tion strategies. In detail, dierent types of cost and demand functions, as well as wireless
trac models and probabilities of demand, are applied to reect spectrum usage in dierent
regions. Moreover, spectrum users have mitigation strategies to actively cope with risks.
The value of mitigation strategies such as leasing spectrum and infrastructure as well as im-
proving are quantied by the real options method for potential demand and spectrum usage
environment changes. The best spectrum usage method is identied according to dierent
decision criteria, such as prot maximization, risk minimization, and mixed strategy that
applies distinct weights to monetary and QoS risks, as well as spectrum entrants' incen-
tives, limitations, and risk awareness. Besides the observation that summarized in executive
summary (section 7.1), some implications can be drawn:
1. ASA shows great potential in getting high prots due to the lack of spectrum cost and
the assumption that they can operate in high transmission power. Because of heavy
regulation of exclusive zone, high transmission power may not be allowed. However, due
to its great potential, the cooperation between PUs and SUs should be encouraged to
allow SUs to operate on high transmission power while protect PUs' services.
2. Comparison of cost and prots in urban and rural area shows that the cost for urban area
is higher than rural area. At the same time, it also brings high prots. In other words,
the risks for spectrum entrants in urban and rural areas are dierent. The challenge for
spectrum entrants in the urban area is the high spectrum cost, infrastructure cost, and
spectrum access opportunities. In rural areas, although the cost requirement is low, the
prots may not be enough to justify the low cost due to low service demand. Therefore,
the challenge for spectrum entrants in rural area is how to create services with sucient
demand and charge at a optimum price.
3. Although accurate anticipation of demand and wireless trac is essential, it may be very
dicult, if not impossible for spectrum entrants to calculate. In this way, quantifying
the value of mitigation strategies that are embedded in each method is critical. Two
categories of mitigation strategies are applied here. When spectrum entrants have higher
service demand or spectrum usage, they can acquire more spectrum by adopting other
spectrum usage methods, or they can change to another spectrum usage method. On
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the other hand, when spectrum entrants have low demand, they have the opportunity to
lease the spectrum to others (PUs only) and lease their infrastructure.
4. In this dissertation, ASA can be recognized as a special case of quasi-static sharing
since it is assumed that the spectrum cost is not applied. Similarly, unlicensed usage
in ISM band can be viewed as a special case of dynamic sharing since the expected
throughput achieve the maximum. If we do not consider these two special cases, here
are some general conclusions: In urban areas, primary usage and quasi-static sharing is
less preferred to dynamic sharing. While in rural area, primary usage and quasi-static
sharing is preferred than dynamic sharing. It is because in the urban area, spectrum cost
is high and the availability of license and leasing agreement is low. Although the dynamic
usage in the urban area face high competition and results in low throughput, at least
spectrum entrants can provide services and expect positive prots. In rural areas, the
low spectrum cost in primary usage and quasi-static sharing provide resource reservation
for spectrum entrants, which leads to higher prots and QoS levels.
5. Some mitigation strategies can improve the throughput: (1) transmit on non-peak hours.
For example, spectrum entrants can transmit before 8am when PUs' usage is low. (2)
when considering the availability of license/leasing agreement in quasi-static sharing and
expected throughput in dynamic sharing, at least one spectrum usage method from each
category should be applied in order to provide continuous services.
6. The target spectrum entrant in this decision making process have a time-varying behav-
ior. Similar conclusion can be made for spectrum entrant with constant transmission
behavior, although the level of QoS risks changes. Moreover, based on the current as-
sumption, event based service providers cannot get prots in any of these methods, due
to the heavy initial costs. In other words, infrastructure based spectrum sharing may not
be worth for short term services. Wireless service providers may opt to become MVNOs
that lease infrastructure or services from Mobile Network Operators (MNOs).
Some assumptions limit the application of this risk and decision analysis model. First,
the spectrum hole is assumed to be exogenous. However, in reality, the spectrum hole may
be endogenous. PUs can decrease the spectrum hole by transmitting meaningless data.
Modeling endogenous spectrum holes and incentivize PUs to share spectrum with SUs are
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future research directions. Second, spectrum entrants' risk attitude heavily impact on the
spectrum decision. In this dissertation, it is assumed that spectrum entrants are risk-neutral.
When they are risk-averse and risk-seeking, dierent spectrum usage choice will be made.
Third, in the queueing model, it is assumed that spectrum users can detect others' service
and coordinate with each other perfectly. The greedy behavior and interference due to
imperfect detection and wireless channels are ignored. This can be improved by replacing
the existing static service rate to a function of service rate that depends on distance. Fourth,
the distribution in this dissertation, such as the one in the real options analysis, only considers
linear distribution. Other distribution of revenue can be applied to achieve realistic results.
The ultimate goal for this dissertation is to cope with uncertainties and risks in technology
adoption. Users of technology and regulators benet from understanding and minimizing
risks. Generally speaking, users of technology, such as spectrum users, can model the risk to
have a better understanding before adopt the technology. Moreover, they have two methods
to actively manage the risk. The rst one is decision model that help users to make informed
decision after evaluating risks and uncertainties. In this dissertation, risk is a ratio based
on the expected and required value. In the future research, the risk can be estimated as
a probability distribution. The second one is options and real options. Real options have
already been largely applied in electricity generation area. Due to its merit of minimizing
risks, it can be applied to other technology adoption eld with careful design. For example,
the priority access in spectrum sharing between federal and non-federal users in 3.5 GHz can
be realized by option [125]. Then, users with priority access have the right but not obligations
to exclude others' access. Research questions like the value of the option, implementation,
and the impact from SUs at adjacent channel and areas are important.
Regulator is another essential player in technology adoption. The understanding of po-
tential risks, uncertainties, as well as technology users' choices are key to policy interventions.
Enforcement is one way to reduce uncertainties and risks for technology users, which is not
considered in this dissertation. Thus, enforcement with an associated cost could be one
choice for spectrum entrants to share the spectrum, or recognized as a mitigation strategy.
At large, it is hoped that in the future, the technology adoption problems due to uncertainties
and risks can be solved by decision models and risk minimization tools.
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APPENDIX A
SELECTED LICENSE AUCTION STATISTICS
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Table 13: Statistics of FCC areas for Pittsburgh, PA, Washington D.C., New York, NY
BTA MEA REA CMA EA
Name 350 Pittsburgh, PA 12 Pittsburgh 3 Great Lakes 13 Pittsburgh, PA 53 Pittsburgh, PA-WV
Population 4,148,373 54,327,300 2,035,968 2,971,829
Name 461 Washington, DC 5 Washington 1 Northeast 8 Washington, DC-MD-VA 13
Washington-Baltimore,
DC-MD-VA-WV-PA
Population 7,745,433 47,172,015 4,182,658 8,403,130
Name 321 New York, NY 2 New York City 1 Northeast
1 New York, NY-NJ/Nassau-Suolk,
NY/Newark, Jersey City
and Paterson-Clifton-Passic, NJ
10 New York-No. New Jer.-Lon Island,
NY-NJ-CT-PA-MA-CT
Population 29,027,017 47,172,015 16,134,166 25,712,577
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APPENDIX B
VALIDATION OF THE M/G/C QUEUE SIMULATION
There is no analytic solution for state probability in M/G/C queue. Therefore, the validation
is done through M/M/C queue with C = 1. According to the analytic solution, the state
probability for M/M/1 queue can be calculated as following:
i = (1  )i (B.1)
where,  = 

. In this validation,  = 1 and  = 2. Therefore, i =
1
2i
. Following is the
comparison of 50 simulation results and analytic results.
0 1 2 3 4 5
Analytical Results 0.5 0.25 0.125 0.0625 0.03125 0.015265
Simulation Results 0.500707 0.249392 0.125174 0.062451 0.031088 0.015896
Dierence -0.00071 0.000608 -0.00017 4.89e-05 0.000162 -0.00027
6 7 8 9 10 11
Analytical Results 0.007813 0.003906 0.001953 0.000977 0.000488 0.000244
Simulation Results 0.007257 0.003992 0.002117 0.001071 0.000476 0.000158
Dierence 0.000556 -8.5e-05 -0.00016 -9.4e-05 1.19e-05 8.64e-05
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